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INTRODUCTION 
As the Clinton Administration drew to a close it seemed as if the thaw in US-Iranian 
relations was well under way. No direct dialogue between the two governments had 
been established but impromptu meetings and discussions behind the scenes were taking 
place and numerous positive statements were being made. In August 1998 US 
Secretary of State, Madeline Albright and Iran's foreign minister, Kamal Kharazi both 
attended a UN meeting to discuss Afghanistan. Officially they did not speak to each 
other but officials admitted that there was "symbolic significance in the fact that Ms. 
Albright and Mr Kharazi are likely to be in the same room for hours."1 Encouraged by 
the Reformist's overwhelming parliamentary victory in February 2000, Madeline 
Albright's speech soon after to the American-Iranian Council sounded an even more 
positive note. "My hope is that both in Iran and in the United States, we can plant the 
seeds now for a new and better relationship in years to come."2 American sanctions on 
products such as food, medicines and luxury goods were also lifted. 
Such overtures were not one sided. President Khatami announced in 1997: "we are in 
favour of relations with all countries and nations who respect our independence, dignity 
and interests."3 Furthermore, in his now famous CNN interview in 1998, Khatami 
called for increased cultural relations between the US and Iran in what he termed 'a 
dialogue of civilisations'. There were encouraging signs that Iran was reforming, both 
domestically and in its foreign policy. Attitudes to the Middle East peace process were 
becoming less defiant. Iran was improving relations with many former adversaries 
including the Gulf countries. Support for Islamic extremists was declining and Iran was 
playing a constructive role in conflicts such as those in Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. 
There was strong evidence in 2000 to suggest that the new American administration 
would continue on the same line of cautious rapprochement. Both the incumbent 
President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney were closely associated with the oil 
industry and were therefore under pressure to lift sanctions to allow American 
companies into Iran. The security and economic interests of America and Iran continued 
1 Shenon, P., 'US and Iran in Further Thaw, Will Join in Afghan Talks', The New York Times. (19 
September 1998), [www.nyt.com] 
2 Albright, M., 'American-Iranian Relations', Remarks before the American-Iranian Council, 
( 17 March 2000), [ secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000317] 
3 Khatami, M., Hope and Challenge: the Iranian President Speaks, (Binghampton University Press, New 
York, 1997), p.96 
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to converge suggesting that improved relations would be inevitable. Mutual concerns 
over Afghanistan continued to deepen and mutual economic benefits from trade and 
investment, especially in the oil and gas sector remained. Furthermore Iran was 
building constructive relations with many of the US's allies including Japan, Europe 
and Russia, leaving America more and more isolated in its stance. 
Despite all of the above, recent decisions and statements by the current US goverrunent 
have reiterated the hard line of the dual contairunent policy. The most recent US 
Patterns of Global Terrorism Report of 2001 states: "Iran remained the most active state 
sponsor of terrorism. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry 
of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) continued to be involved in the planning and 
support of terrorist acts and supported a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue 
their goals . . . Iran continued to provide Lebanese Hizballah and the Palestinian 
rejectionist groups - notably HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the PFLP-GC 
- with varying amounts of funding, safehaven, training and weapons. It also 
encouraged Hizballah and the rejectionist Palestinian groups to co-ordinate their 
planning and escalate their activities."4 In June 2001 the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 
(ILSA) was extended until 2006.5 A State Department press statement justified the 
extension, saying: "We continue to be deeply concerned about Iran's pursuit of weapons 
of mass destruction and missile delivery systems, its support for terrorism, including 
groups violently opposed to Middle East peace, and its poor human rights record. We 
continue to oppose investment in Iran's petroleum sector and the ILSA remains US 
law."6 Likewise in Iran, whilst relations have been normalising with many other former 
enemies, suggestions of relations with America remain unacceptable to the conservative 
faction in the government, which includes Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. 
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks in America, there 
were again some signs of improving relations. There was a general consensus in 
Washington that Iran was co-operating very constructively in Afghanistan, applying 
diplomatic pressure to the Northern Alliance, providing considerable aid and even 
offering to rescue downed US pilots. However any hope of this leading to direct 
4 US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, (May 2002), 
[ www .state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/index] 
5 This Act, first established in 1996, excludes any company that invests over $20 million in Iran from 
operating in Iran 
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communication was shattered with President Bush's 'State of the Union' address in 
January 2002. In it Bush declared: "Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and 
exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom" 
and along with North Korea and Iraq, Iran "constitutes an 'axis of evil', arming to 
threaten the peace ofthe world."7 
The aim of this thesis is to explore, why in the face of these numerous opportunities, 
rapprochement has consistently failed. This thesis aims to look beyond the mere 
strategic differences between the two countries and focuses on the cultural and 
ideological aspects of the conflict. It explores the validity of the US's interpretation of 
Iranian behaviour and concludes that the US view is distorted by a long-standing 
ideological conflict. The ideological complexities of the relationship must be addressed 
if relations are to improve. 
6 US State Department Spokesman, Question taken at the April 25 2001 Press Briefing, (21 '' April 2001 ), 
[ www. State.gov/r/pa/prs/200 !/index] 
7 Bush, G.W., The President's State of the Union Address, (29 January 2002), 
[ www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/0 1 /print/20020 129-11] 
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1. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
1.1 Realism 
The principle basis of 'realism' is that the state is the primary actor and the main 
concern of the state's leaders is to protect the interests of, and therefore ensure the 
survival of, the state. In the past, especially during the Cold War, "realism taught 
American leaders to focus on interests rather than ideology, and to realise that great 
powers can coexist even if they have antithetical values and beliefs."8 America names 
five principle concerns when justifying its policy of isolation and rejection of Iran: (1) 
support for international terrorism, (2) opposition to Israel and the Middle East peace 
process, (3) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, (4) threats and subversive 
activities against its neighbours and (5) its "dismal" human rights record.9 America 
consistently maintains that unless Iran remedies the above then relations with Iran are 
unacceptable. This seems to support the notion of 'realism' being prevalent in US 
foreign policy making. It seems on face value that America's problem with Iran relates 
to 'real,' strategic threats to American and world interests. The implication is 
therefore that if Iran desists from the above then America would be prepared to establish 
relations. 
The reality of the US-Iran relations is however considerably more complex. An 
analysis based purely on 'realism' is inadequate. America's interpretation ofthe Iranian 
'threat' is heavily contested and not just by Iran. Many American academics argue that 
accusations levelled at Iran are often exaggerated and unjustified. This is explored in 
detail in Chapter 2, which concludes, as does the US academic James Bill, that: "there is 
a glaring lack of evidence to support most of the allegations" and that "many of the past 
accusations made against Iran have been quietly proven false." 10 Graham Fuller, a 
senior analyst at the RAND Corporation agrees, saying of the concerns with Iran: 
"while seeming quite straightforward and explicit, they are in fact a complex mixture of 
fact, semi-fact and much politically convenient but quite selective interpretation of 
8 Dunne, T., 'Realism' in The Globalization of World Politics, John Baylis & Steve Smith (eds), (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1998), p.11 0 
9 US State Department, Background Notes: Iran, (updated December 2001), 
[ www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/5341] 
10 Tarock, A., 'US-Iran relations: heading for confrontation?', in Third World Quarterly, vol. 17, (1996), 
p.153 
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reality. As such they are subject to multiple interpretation." 11 It is important to note 
however, that much of the American position is based on inaccessible classified 
intelligence, which cannot be independently verified. Much of the analysis is therefore 
subject to conjecture and supported by inconclusive and politicised evidence. 
Moreover, in recent years, continued estrangement has often directly opposed both 
American and Iranian interests. Whilst the economic and strategic interests of both Iran 
and America have continued to converge, relations have been at best static and at worst 
diverging. If American foreign policy was based purely in 'realism' then the benefits 
from the oil and gas trade and co-operation on Afghanistan and Iraq (particularly post 
September 11th) would have led to the establishment of some kind of dialogue, probably 
following the European model. Since the Iran-Iraq War, Iran's priority has been the 
development of its economy. It was therefore in Iran's interest to move away from 
revolutionary zeal, towards pragmatic policies designed to re-integrate Iran into the 
international scene. American interests lie, not in isolation but in cultivating this 
pragmatism. 
An analysis of US-Iran relations must therefore go beyond an analysis of real interests, 
and examine the long-standing ideological misunderstandings and antagonism within 
the relationship. The notion of the 'clash of civilisations', which was coined in 
Huntington's now infamous article published in 1993 12, is symbolic of a gradual shift 
within US policy and attitudes towards Iran and the Islamic world as a whole since the 
1979 Iranian Revolution. The US has moved away from a largely pragmatic approach, 
towards the ideological. Well into the first decade of the revolution, America still 
perceived Iran as a state within the world system. Iran remained a state, which the US 
considered it necessary to work and negotiate with to the benefit of American interests. 
More recently however, the US has begun to see an Islamic Iran as a state outside the 
system and a threat to the system. This is explained, not by an increase in practical 
difficulties within the relationship, but in the growth and solidification of the ideological 
and cultural conflict. William Beeman believes that after 1979: "the two nations went 
beyond simple misunderstanding or conflict of interests, and their differences were 
essentially cultural. Each nation, led by governmental leaders, constructed a 
11 Fuller, G., 'Repairing US-Iranian Relations,' Middle East Policy, vol. 6 (1998), [www.mepc.org] 
12 Huntington, S.P., 'The Clash of Civilisations?', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, (1993), pp.22-49 
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mythological image that served to 'demonise' the other." 13 In short, both Iran and the 
US have constructed an image of the other that has detrimentally distorted the 
relationship ever since. 
1.2 Ideology 
Chapter 3 examines these perceptions, exploring the historical and ideological basis of 
the conflict and its lasting effect on the relationship. The ideological nature of the 
American Iranian conflict makes an exclusively realist analysis of the relationship very 
difficult. As Mannheim's theory on ideology suggests, the realist basis of current 
American policy cannot be separated from ideology. Mannheim developed a theory on 
ideology that said that everyone operates within ideology. Objectivity is therefore 
impossible. Everyone is influenced by perspectives, belief systems, past experiences 
and environment and cannot remove themselves from these when analysing a situation 
or making a decision. When policy makers construct a policy, for example towards 
Iran, they are influenced by their own ideological perspective and are therefore unable 
to make decisions about what is in the national interest in a vacuum. Charles Taber, in 
his work on foreign policy belief systems, states: "through selective perception and 
distortion, decision makers bias incoming information about the world to conform to 
preconception. In addition, decision makers may develop rigid belief systems 
containing highly simplified images that restrict flexibility in the diagnosis of world 
events and in the choice among perceived altematives."14 Forming policy based on the 
national interest, in other words 'realism', is therefore ideological in itself. 
American policy is presented in realist terms to make it acceptable. Policy can only be 
justified if is seen to be a rational, objective analysis of a situation. Policymakers 
cannot admit and may not be able to see the role ideology plays in their decision 
making. If they could then their decisions lose the legitimacy of objectivity and 
rationality and become mere subjective opinions. This has occurred in the case of Iran; 
the US has presented five tangible concerns to justify policy but in reality the US 
perception of the Iranian threat is based on contestable and highly subjective evidence. 
The US has not formed policy based purely on an objective analysis of Iran's behaviour. 
13 Beeman, W., 'Double Demons: Cultural Impedance in US-Iranian Understanding' in Iran at the 
Crossroads in a turbulent decade, Miran Rezun (ed), (Westview Press, Oxford, 1990), p.165 
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Iran's image, past animosity and outside influences have all played a part in influencing 
perceptions of Iran's actions, making the formation of a rational, unprejudiced policy 
impossible. 
1.3 The concept of hegemony as a useful tool for analysis 
The ideological antagonism between the US and Iran, discussed in chapter 3, can be 
explained in terms oflran's challenge to American ideology. Post Revolutionary Iran is 
seen by America as an opponent of its ideological basis and a direct threat to its 
ideological standing in the world. Iran was and is still seen as a challenge to a growing 
ideological consensus and therefore outside the world system. This is a theme that runs 
throughout all aspects of the ideological conflict. The US experience of the 1979 
Revolution and beyond, the perception of Islam and Iran's revolutionary ideology are 
all ideas that have helped construct the idea of Iran as an opponent of America's 
ideological basis and ambitions. This perception has, in turn, helped to entrench the 
antagonistic relationship we see today. This idea of Iran being the antithesis and direct 
opponent of American ideology means Washington cannot see any possibility of Iran 
being a constructive member of the international system. Isolation and condemnation is 
therefore deemed to be the only feasible policy option. 
It is here that Gramsci' s concept of hegemony is useful as a tool for analysis. Gramsci 
was concerned with class conflict and therefore using his theory in the realm of 
international relations has obvious limitations. However many of his ideas, particularly 
on hegemony, are helpful in exploring the power ideas can have over political and 
social environments. It is crucial to note here that the term hegemony has many 
different meanings in many different disciplines. Its use in this thesis is limited to the 
definition outlined below. 
Gramsci was a Marxist but unlike some believed that the concept of the structure 
(economic wellbeing) dictating the superstructure (politics and ideas) was over 
simplified. He did not accept that the collapse of a capitalist economy would 
automatically bring about communism. If this was the case he argued, then Italy would 
14 Taber, C., 'Poli: An Expert System Model ofUS Foreign Policy Belief Systems', American Political 
Science Review, vol. 86, no. 4, (1992) 
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have become communist not fascist after the economic collapse following the First 
World War. Gramsci believed that there was reciprocal relationship between the 
structure and superstructure, saying: "the claim ... that every fluctuation of politics and 
ideology can be presented and expounded as an immediate expression of the structure, 
must be contested in theory as primitive infantilism." 15 
Gramsci therefore believed that ideas must play a more significant part in any 
revolution. He argued the need to produce a consensus of opinion. Taking over the 
modes of production through force was not enough. To obtain economic and political 
supremacy, he insisted it was necessary to persuade people that the communist 
movement was in their own interests. This was termed a 'war of position'. He 
proposed to conduct this war of position through education, using institutions such as 
the church, the school system, the press, political parties and even the family. 
Intellectuals were therefore deemed by Gramsci crucial to any revolution; they were the 
people in the position to influence opinions and perceptions. It is important to note that 
Gramsci's definition of an intellectual is broader than one would commonly expect. 
According to David Forgacs, he defines intellectuals as: "anyone whose function in 
society is primarily that of organizing, administrating, directing, educating or leading 
others." 16 These intellectuals would help overthrow the old order by propagating a new, 
comprehensive, universally accepted ideology. 
Gramsci saw ideological periods as 'historic blocs', which could only be recognised in 
retrospect. In the establishment of an historic bloc Gramsci described three levels of 
political consciousness or moments. 17 The first, the economic-corporate level describes 
an awareness of common interest amongst a specific group. Gramsci uses the example 
of a tradesman feeling solidarity with another tradesman, a manufacturer with another 
manufacturer but there are no feelings of solidarity between manufacturer and 
tradesman. The second level of consciousness occurs when an entire social group or 
class deem themselves to have common interests, but these interests remain entirely 
economic. It is when the interests of one group transcend a whole society including 
15 Ibid, p.l90 
16 Forgacs, D., A Gramsci Reader, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1988), p.300 
17 See Gramsci, A. in A Gramsci Reader, David Forgacs (ed), p.205-206 and Cox, R.W., 'Gramsci, 
Hegemony and International Relations: an Essay on Method' in Gramsci, Historical Materialism and 
International Relations, Gill, S. (ed), (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993), p.57 
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subordinate groups that the hegemonic level is reached. Gramsci describes this stage 
as: 
"The phase in which previously genninated ideologies become 'party', come into 
confrontation and conflict, until only one of them, or at least a single combination of 
them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself over the whole area -
bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual 
and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a 
corporate but on a 'universal plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental 
social group over a series of subordinate groups." 18 
In other words a universally accepted, consensus of opinion about what is right evolves 
so that no one questions whether the ideology of the ruling class is not that of society. 
Gramsci makes an important separation between domination and hegemony. 
Domination occurs through forcing an idea or will on others (what Gramsci terms a 
'war of movement' 19), but hegemony occurs through consensus. An ideology must be 
seen as in the universal interest to be hegemonic. Both domination and hegemony are 
useful tools to any group or society wishing to achieve national or international 
supremacy but are seen by Gramsci as distinct. 
The formation of the US's global ideology 
Before being able to understand the nature of the Iranian challenge, it must be made 
clear what exactly Iran was seen to be challenging. Since the Second World War, what 
can be described as a world hegemony has been evolving, with America its driving 
force. America emerged from the War with a strong sense of self-belief in their nation, 
their free society, and their capitalist system. The Nazis and fascists of Europe and 
Japan symbolised everything that the US and its ideology were not. The horrors of the 
war only reinforced to Americans that the American 'way' was right and should be 
followed the world over. American ideology had evolved out of the Christian pilgrim 
and anti colonialist tradition. America fought Britain for the right to be free and 
18 Gramsci, A. in A Gramsci Reader, David Forgacs (ed), p.205 
19 Cox, R.W., 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: an Essay on Method', p.52 
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independent. Protecting these hard fought rights of democracy and freedom became the 
basis of a strong universally accepted American ideology. 
By the twentieth century and Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and the League of 
Nations, America began to see these beliefs in a global, universal sense. Following the 
Second World War, the Soviet Union bloc took on the role of the Other and again 
American society was convinced of the evilness of communism and the rightness of 
liberalism. Using American ideology as a tool to dominate the world was never a 
conscious political decision, but arose because of the strength of belief in the US in the 
'American way'. As once one of two superpowers and now the sole superpower, 
America has felt a certain duty to promote and protect what they see as the 'correct' and 
only path of development. Any opposition to American way is seen in the context of a 
direct challenge to the basis of the American state itself and as such is seen as a threat. 
In its movement towards global dominance, the US has had two tools at its disposal. 
The first is ideological hegemony. Here, the state, through the dissemination of ideas 
attempts to persuade the world of states that its own ideology is universal, the norm and 
serving everyone's interests. A successful hegemony would be one where the ideas of 
the dominant state become a truly universal, international phenomenon. If an ideology 
is seen to exploit then it has failed to be truly hegemonic. The second tool is 
domination through force or coercion. Here a state's ideology is forced upon others 
using superior economic, political or military power. Gramsci claims that supremacy 
maintained by domination is comparatively weaker than supremacy maintained by 
hegemony. He argues that the former usually occurs when the latter has failed. "To 
mask the lack of consensus the representatives of power always proclaim grand moral 
principles to justify the use of force. "20 
In reality, despite Fukuyama's 'End of Ideology' thesis, no state or group of states has 
been able to create a pure world hegemony. Much of the compliance to, for example, 
American hegemony, has occurred because of what Gramsci calls a 'Passive 
Revolution'. These were "societies which had so to speak imported or had thrust upon 
them aspects of a new order created abroad, without the old order having been 
20 Augelli, E. & Murphy C.N., 'Gramsci and International Relations: A General Perspective and Example 
From Recent US Policy Toward the Third World', in Gramsci. Historical Materialism and International 
Relations, Gill, S. (ed), (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993), p.l28 
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displaced."21 This would perhaps explain the fragility of the American-Iranian 
relationship, which dramatically disintegrated after the revolution. Whilst Iran under 
the Shah took on many aspects of American ideology, the old order was not completely 
displaced. America had not created a true hegemony in Iran, which meant significant 
and dangerous opposition to the American 'way' remained. Worryingly for the US, 
similar tensions still exist in other parts of the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia. Here 
the elite have been successfully co-opted, but many of the people remain sceptical or 
even resentful of America's influence. 
Despite the failings of the hegemonic aspects of American foreign policy, the US does 
provide the most recent and most comprehensive example of the process. There are 
various factors and circumstances that have enabled the US to create and maintain its 
world order. The first is America's economic dominance following the war, which 
undoubtedly provided another significant basis for its hegemony. Gramsci believed 
there was a reciprocal relationship between the base and superstructure and therefore 
argued that both were needed to achieve hegemony. "In industrial societies only social 
groups performing an essential role in the mode of production can become hegemonic 
. . . This essential role in the world of production is what first confers prestige on a 
leading social group and makes its dominant social and political role acceptable to 
others."22 The reliance of much of the world on American aid for economic recovery 
after the war catapulted America into this prestigious position. Noam Chomsky agrees 
saying: "The United States emerged from the war with about 50% of the world's wealth 
and an incomparable position of security. It was in a position of global power with few, 
if any, parallels in history.'m 
Economic power is one thing, but according to Gramsci not enough to achieve 
hegemony. Successful dissemination of the ideology so that the recipients believe in its 
universal benefit is essential. According to Gramsci, intellectuals play a very important 
role in this task. They help to convince people that, as Gramsci puts it: "the 'rational' is 
actively and actually real."24 American intellectuals have played a significant part in 
producing economic, political and philosophical theories whose dissemination has gone 
21 Cox, R.W., 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: an Essay in Method', p.54 
22 Ibid, p.l30 
23 Chomsky, N., 'Israel's Role in US Foreign Policy', in Lackman, Z. & Beinin, J. (eds), Intifada: the 
Palestinian Uprising V. Israeli Occupation, (South End Press, Boston, 1989), pp.256 
24 Gramsci, A. in A Gramsci Reader, David Forgacs ( ed), p.l93 
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a long way in making the world accept American ideas of liberal democracy, capitalism 
and universal rights as the norm. Adam Smith, Huntington, Rousseau and Fukuyama 
are such examples. 
Another tool of the potential hegemon and one that America has certainly used to 
considerable effect is international organisations. Robert Cox gives five features of 
international organisations which express their hegemonic role: 
"(1) they embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; 
(2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order; (3) they ideologically 
legitimate the norms of the world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from the peripheral 
countries and (5) they absorb counter-hegemonic ideas."25 
Take the UN as an example. Although "all the member states - large and small, rich 
and poor, with differing political views and social systems- have a voice and vote,"26 
UN rules, charters and resolutions of the UN tend to embody the American 'way'. The 
organisation of the UN means that any decision or resolution gives the appearance of 
consensus, but in fact power and influence is heavily slanted in favour of the Security 
Council, which includes America and other allies such as the United Kingdom and 
France. Huntington agrees, saying: "Decisions made at the UN Security Council or the 
International Monetary Fund that reflect the interests of the West are presented to the 
world as reflecting the desires of the world community. The very phrase 'world 
community' has become the euphemistic collective noun to give global legitimacy to 
actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers.'m The 
UN is also heavily reliant on America's economic and military superiority, giving 
America further influence. The recent fiasco with America's failure to pay dues of over 
one billion US dollars to the UN unless certain conditions were met is one example of 
this influence being put into practice. 
Economic organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank are particularly useful to 
America. In the case of the IMF, states are brought into the fold and helped to develop, 
but only on the terms of the dominant world order. In other words, loans are only 
25 Cox, R.W., 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: an Essay in Method', p.62 
26 
'How the UN works', (27 November 2001), [www.un.org/Overview.brief] 
27 Huntington, S.P., 'The Clash of Civilisations', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, (1993), p.39 
16 
granted if reforms are made to bring the state's economy closer to the American model. 
Direct manipulation by America of international organisations in pursuit of hegemony is 
not uncommon. For example, the US consistently objects to the IMF granting 
assistance to Iran because Iran is seen to be against America's world order. Despite 
support for Iran from the rest of the world, the US has also vetoed Iran's application to 
the WTO for the last five years, keeping them "out in the cold."28 
To maintain a hegemony, economic development is crucial. For a world order to be 
seen to have succeeded by its adherents, economic development must occur. Otherwise 
it will no longer be seen as in the universal interest and consensus will break down. 
This may go some way to explaining the failure of the Soviet Union's hegemonic 
project. After the Cold War the American hegemonic attempt benefited greatly from 
the perceived success of the free market economy. Agnew and Corbridge describe this 
period as "the hegemony of 'transnational liberalism'" and comment that "a new 
ideology ofthe market (and market access) [was] being embedded in and reproduced by 
a powerful constituency of liberal states, international institutions, and what might be 
called the 'circuits of capital' themselves. Much of the world was brought into the 
world market economy, or at least aspired to join in."29 Often the opposition to 
America's world order is from those who are not benefiting economically; those, such 
as Iran, who have been excluded from the system and those whose economies, for 
whatever reason, are failing and are unable to 'join in'. Therefore the main opposition 
to America's hegemony comes largely from the third world, not economically 
successful European or East Asian states. 
In these cases, the other tool for achieving supremacy is needed: domination. Augelli 
and Murphy say: "Gramsci sees the supremacy of a corporate actor as based on 
hegemony over allies within the historic bloc and domination, either by force or fraud, 
of those social groups outside the alliance. "30 American economic sanctions on Iran, 
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act and the promulgation of Iran as a global menace are 
all examples of this dominance of a state outside the alliance. These policies are made 
28 Doole, C., 'US Blocks Iran WTO Application', BBC News, (9 May 2001), 
[ www.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle _ east/newsid _1320000/I 320334] 
29 Baylis, J. & Smith, S. (eds), The Globalization of World Politics, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1998), p.377 
30 Augelli E. & Murphy, C.N., 'Gramsci and International Relations: A General Perspective and Example 
From Recent US Policy Toward The Third World', p.133 
17 
toward Iran because America sees Iran as outside and a challenge to its ideological 
basis. 
1.4 The Washington Policy Monopoly 
Chapter 4 applies Gramsci' s ideas on hegemony in a different respect: in respect of the 
American foreign policy making process. Part of the reason why Iran is viewed so 
negatively in the US is the lack of accurate information about and remarkable absence 
of any significant debate on Iran within Washington. One way of understanding this is 
the existence of a Gramscian style hegemony over policy. Despite the fact that 
America's policy on Iran has attracted much criticism from Iran, the rest of the world 
and a minority in Washington, the policy consensus remains largely unchallenged and 
widely accepted. Negative perceptions of Iran within the policy-making process have 
become firmly entrenched. Chapter 4 explores the notion that this is largely because of 
a highly successful Gramscian 'war of position'. Intellectuals (Gramsci's definition) 
such as interest groups, individual politicians, government departments and the media 
have actively encouraged and maintained a certain perception of Iran to the detriment of 
debate and discussion. Challenges to the American policy consensus do exist from 
within Iran and also from within Washington. These however, are weak and have 
limited effect, further supporting the idea of a remarkable policy monopoly. 
1.5 The Case Study 
A case study on the events after the September 11th attacks on the US follows in chapter 
5. This is designed to demonstrate how the ideological aspects of the relationship 
operate within a contemporary example. More specifically it shows how the strength of 
the ideological conflict thwarted another key opportunity for improvement in relations. 
18 
1.6 Methodology 
This thesis was planned following considerable background reading, particularly on 
Gramsci and the other theorists. It was broken down into subject areas, which were 
then focused on in turn: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional relations, 
human rights, the Revolution, the US foreign policy process, the Israeli Lobby, Track 2, 
Khatami and September 11th. 
Primary information on Iranian and American foreign policy was gathered from a 
number of sources. The internet provided the necessary US government reports, 
statements and testimonies, most usefully from the State Department, the Defence 
Department and Congress. Speeches from the Iranian government, particularly by 
Khatami and Khamenai, were obtained from the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 
In March 2002, during a research trip to Washington and New York, a number of 
former US officials, academics and journalists were interviewed. The most useful of 
these was Dr Gary Sick from Columbia University. Most of the interviews were 
recorded. These interviews were supplemented by a series of interviews carried out by 
the BBC correspondent in Washington, Stephen Sackur (broadcast on BBC Radio 4) 
and the transcripts and video recordings of lectures given by Robert Pelletreau and Gary 
Sick, amongst others. 
Research into US concerns with recent Iranian behaviour concentrated primarily on 
American academics and commentators, such as Sick, Fuller, Zunes, Morton, 
Cordesman, Eisenstadt and Clawson. Americans were chosen to counter Americans to 
make the arguments more credible. There was a concern that Iranian commentators 
would be too open to bias. 
Finally all the different subject areas were brought together and the thesis was 
completed with a case study and conclusion. 
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2. IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSED 
2.1 Iran as a patron of international terrorism 
America's case against Iran is explicit and uncompromising. In their 'Patterns of 
Global Terrorism Report 2000', the US State Department stated: "Despite domestic 
political changes that suggest evolution towards a more moderate policy, Iran remained 
the primary state sponsor of terrorism."31 Over the last twenty years America has 
accused Iran of involvement in numerous significant terrorist attacks, political 
assassinations and of supporting Islamic opposition groups abroad. These accusations 
are aimed at the highest level in Tehran because Washington claims the Iranian 
government is complicit and even directs terrorist policies. The US Congress in 'the 
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996' accuses the Government of Iran of using "its 
diplomatic facilities and quasi-governmental institutions outside of Iran to promote acts 
of international terrorism."32 During the Rafsanjani presidency, the thought amongst 
many experts, including the American academic and former government official, 
Anthony Cordesman, was that there were clear links between "Iran's acts of terrorism 
and support of extremist groups and the Iranian Supreme Council for National 
Security."33 This Council includes the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, the 
President and the head of Iran's secret services. More recently, the Patterns of Global 
Terrorism Report 2000 limits criticism to certain elements of the Tehran government: 
"Its Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security 
(MOIS) continued to be involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts and 
continued to support a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals."34 
Since the bombing of the US marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 America has linked Iran 
to most major international terrorist incidents, including the 1994 attack against a 
Jewish centre in Buenos Aries and the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 
1996. Adam Tarock argues that "ever since the Iranian revolution, in the political 
vocabulary of US officials and therefore hence in the media, the name of Iran has 
31 US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, (Apri12000), 
[ www .state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/index.cfm] 
32 
'Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996' in Congressional Record, [ wais.access.gpo.gov] 
33 Cordesman, A. & Hashim, A., Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment, (Westview, Oxford, 1997), p.l48 
34 US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 
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become synonymous with terrorism. "35 The US State Department claims that "Iran was 
involved in forty five significant terrorist incidents in 1987, twenty four incidents in 
1989, ten in 1990, five in 1991, twenty in 1992, six in 1993, six in 1994 and at least six 
in 1995."36 The Patterns of Global Terrorism Reports over the last few years have 
continued to accuse Iran of assassinating political dissidents, sponsoring groups 
opposing Israel and having links with terrorist groups in the wider world. 
If US accusations are taken as incontrovertible then it would seem that Iran deserves its 
reputation and position as the world's primary state sponsor of terrorism. However the 
American position is highly contentious. Not only do many in Iran refute the American 
stance, but many American academics, European governments and other US allies also 
argue that the American position is exaggerated, outdated and too heavily reliant on 
Israeli intelligence. Perpetual demonisation and strong rhetoric from both sides has 
meant US policy has never been based on a rational analysis of Iran's involvement in 
terrorism. This has been particularly damaging because, as Gary Sick, former member 
of the US National Security Council between 1976 and 1981, remarks, "US policy 
objectives were defined in the broadest possible terms, with no benchmarks and few 
specific examples."37 This left observers "free to interpret the policy according to their 
own understanding and on the basis of highly selective evidence."38 Therefore 
perceptions oflran's foreign policy have been and remain incredibly subjective. 
2.1.1 Dissident assassination 
American figures are damaging; the US State Department points to eight assassinations 
outside of Iran in 1996 and thirteen in 1997.39 The 1998 Patterns of Global Terrorism 
Report stated that anti-dissident assassinations had declined, but mentions four murders 
in Tajikistan and Pakistan that were potentially carried out by Iranian intelligence 
agents.40 
35 Tarock, A., 'US-Iran Relations: heading for confrontation?', Third World Quarterly, vol. 17 ( 1996), 
p.l53 
36 Cordesman, A. & Hashim, A., Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment, p.147 
37 Sick, G., 'Rethinking Dual Containment', Survival, vol. 40, no. I, ( 1998), p.13 
38 Ibid, p.13 
39 US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996, (April 1997), 
[ www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1996Report/overview 1 & Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997, 
(April 1998), [ www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1997Report1 
40 US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998, (April 1999), 
[ www .state.gov/www/global/terrorism/ 1998Report/sponsor 1 
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Figures alone however do not provide sufficient evidence. This Iranian policy must be 
put into perspective. Firstly, since 1993, there have been no high profile assassinations 
of opposition leaders and nor have there been any assassinations in Europe. The main 
area where extra-territorial assassinations of opponents is still prevalent is in northern 
Iraq against the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK). 
This leads to the more significant qualification of US figures, which is that Iran's 
actions and motivations are similar to others in the region, including Israel. The MEK 
is a US designated terrorist group and violently opposes the Iranian regime, carrying out 
numerous attacks against government and civilian targets. In 1997 alone the MEK 
claimed to have conducted 294 operations inside Iran and in 2000, the organisation 
admitted responsibility for six mortar attacks on civilian government and military 
buildings in Tehran.41 The Iranian government's response has been a campaign of 
targeted assassination and armed raids against the MEK. Just like the Israelis, Iran 
justifies this course of action by arguing it is an issue of national security. In fact Gary 
Sick points out that "Israel's record of extra-territorial assassinations and kidnappings is 
far more extensive than Iran's, even if all the cases attributed by the media to Iran are 
true. "42 It is simply not credible for the US to persist in criticising an Iranian policy of 
killing terrorists, without a similar condemnation of Israel and others in the region. 
America's "War on Terrorism" since the September attacks has made this position all 
the more absurd. 
2.1.2 Support for terrorist groups (excluding Israeli opposition) 
The US accuses Iran of supporting terrorist groups all over the world. The State 
Department reports consistently accuse Iran of providing a safehaven for the Kurdistan 
Workers' Party (PKK) operating in Turkey. The 1996 report also claims Iran sponsored 
a local Shi'ite group that was found to be planning to overthrow the royal family in 
Bahrain.43 Since 1997 the report has commented on Algerian government allegation 
that Iran trains and supplies Algerian Islamic terrorists. Although acknowledging that 
levels had lowered, the 2000 report refers to military, financial and training links with 
41 See US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 and Sick, G., 'Rethinking Dual 
Containment', p.l4 
42 Sick, G., 'Rethinking Dual Containment', p.l3 
43 US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996 
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nine US designated terrorist groups operating in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, 
Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Europe and other parts of the 
Middle East.44 
Furthermore, recently members of Saudi Hezbollah have been indicted by the US for 
carrying out the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers, which killed nineteen US 
servicemen and injured five hundred others. Tehran has been accused of directing the 
operation. The indictment claims: "these Hizballah organizations were inspired, 
supported and directed by elements of the Iranian government."45 An article in the New 
Yorker in May 2001 states that the FBI believes some Iranian intelligence officials 
should also be indicted.46 
These accusations of broad support for terrorism are dubious and exaggerated. For 
example the allegation of PKK safehavens exists on the tenuous basis that one leading 
member of the PKK, the brother of Ocalan, lived in Iran for a while during that year.47 
Fuller claims that "Iran's role in other terrorist incidents in the region, especially since 
the early 1990s, has actually been minima1."48 Although links between Iran and many 
Islamic extremist movements are numerous, it is doubtful that these links are any 
stronger than other states in the world, including Saudi Arabia and the United States 
itself. Saudi Arabia has known links with many extremist Sunni groups, especially in 
Central Asia. Until very recently, the Saudis were open supporters of the Taliban and 
their infiltration of the Central Asia Republics caused Iran to step up its own 
involvement in the region to counter Saudi influence. Furthermore, as the American 
academic, Stephen Zunes points out, "the history of US support for terrorist groups in 
Latin America and elsewhere lends little credibility to Washington's anti-terrorist 
crusade against Iran. "49 
When considering allegations of support for Islamic groups in the region, America must 
be aware that it is very useful for authoritarian regimes, such as the Gulf monarchies, 
44 US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 
45 US District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division, Criminal No. 01-288-A Indictment, 
(June 2001) 
46 Kohr, H., Testimony of Howard A. Kohr (AlP A C) Before the House International Relations 
Committee Subcommittee on the Middle East andSouth Asia, (9 May 2001), 
[ www .house. gov /international_re Iations/kohr0509] 
47 Ibid, p.56 
48 Fuller, G. 'Repairing US-Iranian Relations' 
49 Zunes, S., 'In Focus: Time for Detente' 
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Egypt and Algeria, to blame external influences, such as Iran, for the existence of 
domestic opposition. This opposition is usually home grown and would undoubtedly 
still exist without an Islamic Iran. Morton goes further claiming that: "the allegation 
that Iran supported terrorist groups in North Africa and South and Central Asia is not 
supported by any evidence at all."50 
The issue of responsibility for the Khobar Towers bombing is also highly contestable. 
The indictment's allegations of inspiration, support and direction from 'elements' in the 
Iranian government are vague and ambiguous. It is difficult to ascertain whether this is 
based on the belief that the Iranian government conceived, planned and ordered the 
bombing or whether this is based on a more tenuous ideological link. It is true that 
Hezbollah is Shi'ite organisation and it is also the case that Iran has traditional links 
with the Lebanese Hezbollah. However this does not prove that Tehran was directly 
responsible for the bombing. The indictment is inviting the reader to draw an inference 
that the Iranian government is responsible but the evidence simply does not prove this 
unequivocably. By 1996 Iran was very much following a more pragmatic line towards 
its Gulf neighbours and therefore incitement and encouragement of groups like Saudi 
Hezbollah would have been minimal. Even Iran's involvement in Lebanon had 
dramatically declined. 
2.1.3 Iran's behaviour put into perspective 
Whereas it is impossible to know exact Iranian involvement in Islamic extremism and 
terrorism, it is clear that firstly, this involvement has dramatically declined during the 
last decade and secondly, Iran has no worse a track record than many other states in the 
region. The fact that Iran remains labelled as the world premier state sponsor of 
terrorism has less to do with realities and much more to do with politics. If American 
policy makers analysed the policies of other states in the region, such as Israel and 
Saudi Arabia, with the same criteria it puts on Iran, they would find it far more difficult 
to condemn Iran. 
50 Morton, E., Thinking Beyond the Stalemate in US-Iranian Relations: Volume 2- Issues and Analysis, 
p.56 
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Analysis of Iranian behaviour has been further complicated by the methodology of the 
State Department's Patterns Global Terrorism Reports. This is a significant problem 
because these Reports not only reflect the views of the State Department but they also 
have a considerable influence on the opinions of Congress, as well as on how the media 
presents Iran to the American people. The main criticism arises because Iran is only 
compared to other state sponsors of terrorism; its behaviour is not considered in the 
wider perspective of world terrorism as a whole. When considered thus, by the State 
Department's own definitions, Iran has not been involved in any major terrorist incident 
since the election of Khatami. Out of the one hundred and sixty major incidents in 1999 
and one hundred and thirty-nine in 2000 none were associated with Iran. 51 Despite this, 
the wording of the report ('the number one state sponsor of terrorism') means that the 
perception emerges of Iran as the main cause of international terrorism. In fact 
multinational groups, such as al-Qaeda, are a far greater threat. 
The image of Iran as a prolific and widespread state sponsor of terrorism is not one 
based on reliable evidence, but one based on politicised and contestable information. 
Iran's image was irreparably damaged by its provocative policies during the 1980s and 
because of a continuing atmosphere of mistrust and misunderstanding has been unable 
to shed this perception. The strength of the ideological conflict between America and 
Iran has kept the idea of Iran as a menacing and prolific sponsor of international 
terrorism alive. 
2.2 Opposition to Israel 
The second main criticism of Iranian policy is its support for terrorist groups who 
violently oppose Israel and Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands and, until recently, 
Lebanon. The Global Terrorism Reports over the last few years have consistently 
accused Iran of providing money, weapons and training to groups such as HAMAS, 
Lebanese Hizballah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Even after the election of 
the more moderate President Khatami in 1997, this policy continued unabated. Not 
only does Iran allegedly provide funds and supplies but Tehran also provides moral 
support. Iran encourages co-operation between all groups wishing to disrupt the peace 
process and sees itself as the mentor. For example, in Autumn 1997, a conference of 
51 Morton, E., Thinking Beyond the Stalemate in US-Iranian Relations: Volume 2- Issues and Analysis, 
p.55 
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'Liberation Movements' was held in Tehran, attended by HAMAS, Lebanese 
Hezballah, the PIJ and the Egyptian al Gama'at al Islamiya. Allegedly participants 
discussed "the jihad, establishing greater co-ordination between certain groups, and an 
increase in support for some groups. "52 Another similar conference was held in April 
2001. 
In the 1999 report, the US recognised the efforts of the Reformist movement in Iranian 
politics and narrowed its criticism to 'certain state institutions' such as MOIS and the 
Revolutionary Guards Corps. However the US maintained that Iran was still the most 
active state sponsor of terrorism. This was largely because the links with the anti-Israeli 
movement remained strong. In view of the revival of the peace process after the 
election of the Israeli Prime Minister Barak, Iran's policies were viewed all the more 
negatively. 
The report states: 
"Iran's involvement in terrorist-related activities remained focused on support for 
groups opposed to Israel and peace between Israel and its neighbours ... Iran has long 
provided Lebanese Hizballah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups- notably HAMAS, 
the Palestine Islamic Jihad and Ahmad Jibril's PFLP-GC - with varying amounts of 
funding, safehaven, training and weapons. This activity continued at its already high 
levels following the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May and during the 
intifada in the fall. Iran continued to encourage Hizballah and the Palestinian groups to 
co-ordinate their planning and to escalate their activities against Israel. "53 
Again this Iranian policy must be put into perspective. During the 1980s, Iran's policy 
in Lebanon was blatant and unapologetic. 54 The government placed Revolutionary 
Guards on Lebanese territory to train and support the Shia militia fighting Israeli 
occupation. Links between Hizbollah and the Iranian embassy in Syria were well 
documented and explicit. It was well known that Iran had considerable influence over 
the fate of many of the western hostages taken by Hizbollah during the 1980s. What is 
52 Ibid 
53 US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 
54 Hitti, N., 'Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints', Amirahmadi, H. & 
Entessar, N. (eds), Iran and the Arab World, (MacMillan, Basingstoke, 19930, pp.l80-195 
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not clear is how many incidents were actually directed and ordered by Tehran. There is 
no evidence to say, for example, that the Iranian regime ordered the US marine bombing 
in Beirut in 1983 or any of the many attacks inside Israel. Having said that, Tehran's 
failure to condemn and prevents such attacks clearly amounts to tacit approval. 
There were clear policy changes during the 1990s that must be acknowledged. 
Revolutionary Guards were removed from Lebanon. Although financial and arms 
support for groups such as Hizbollah, HAMAS and PIJ continues, many analysts agree 
that the level has dramatically decreased. 55 The Iranian government, since the election 
of Khatami, has been at pains to condemn all forms of terrorism. In his book published 
in 1997, Khatami said of terrorism: "We have always been against terrorism, especially 
state-sponsored terrorism. We should join hands to fight terrorism."56 This is 
consistent with the original ideas on exporting the revolution, which, according to 
Khomeini was meant to be done by example, not by force and interference. 
When considering Iranian policy, America must be careful not to use Iranian rhetoric, 
such as calls for 'death to Israel', as evidence to support allegations of terrorism. Whilst 
Iran remains firmly opposed to Israel and the peace process because they see it as biased 
and unrepresentative of the Palestinian position, this does not mean they will resist the 
process violently. Again in Khatami's speech to CNN he said: "We have declared our 
opposition to the Middle East peace process because we believe it will not succeed. At 
the same time, we have clearly said that we don't intend to impose our views on others 
or to stand in their way."57 In other words, Iran would accept any agreement supported 
by the Palestinians. In the meantime, Iran sees its support for Palestinian resistance 
groups as part of a war against Israel, not as support for terrorism, the definition of 
which is highly debatable. Fuller of the RAND Corporation believes that "ugly as 
terrorism is, it must be seen as a form of war itself, and those wars must be seen in the 
perspective of the broad regional military struggle, with different sides employing 
different weapons, B-52's, tanks, naval aircrafts, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism, with 
victims on all sides."58 Iran's support for HAMAS or PIJ can be seen as part of an 
55 See Fuller, G., 'Repairing US-Iranian Relations', Sick, G., 'Rethinking Dual Containment', p.l6 & 
Zunes, S., 'In Focus: Time for Detente', Foreign Policy In Focus, vol. 4, no. 28 (1999), 
[ www.igc.org/infocus/briefs/vol4/v4n28iran] 
56 Khatami, M., Hope and Challenge: Our President Speaks, (Binghampton University, New York, 1997), 
p.96 
7 Sick, G., 'Rethinking Dual Containment', p.21 
58 Fuller, G., 'Repairing US-Iranian Relations' 
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armed conflict between two states and as such, it is not uncommon for different sides in 
a war to be supported by exterior states. 
Moral and financial support for Palestinian resistance groups has been stepped up since 
the intifada and statements from both factions of the Iranian government have become 
more antagonistic. In December 2000, Khatami said of Israeli policy in the occupied 
territories: "the massacre of innocent people, rendering the Muslim Palestinians 
homeless and usurpation of the Al-Aqsa Mosque are an insult to all Muslim nations."59 
and his moderate foreign minister, Kharrazi called for Israeli officials to be tried for war 
crimes. 60 However, whilst the rhetoric emanating from Tehran is considerably harsher, 
there are other countries in the region who have closer links with Palestinian groups and 
also provide considerable funds. For example, the ex-state department official and 
political analyst, Elaine Morton points out: "While Iran gives financial support to 
groups like Hizbollah, HAMAS, the PIJ, and the PFLP-GC, it is Syria that gives these 
groups political direction and support."61 Iran is able to voice such criticism of Israel 
because, unlike many Arab states, they are not directly involved in the dispute; they do 
not have to take into account the ramifications on settlement negotiations or border 
security. 
As with all Iranian foreign policy decisions there is much ambiguity about the extent of 
the involvement of various government factions. The Palestinian case is a perfect 
example. Whereas the more ideological, conservative factions in government, such as 
the Supreme Leader, vehemently attack Israel and American support for Israel and 
consistently call for the funding of Hizbollah, other elements in the government are 
trying to be more co-operative. As the situation in Israel and the Occupied Territories 
worsens, it is more difficult for the reformist elements to challenge the hardliners. 
Despite this, after the Israelis discovered that Iran had attempted to send arms to the 
Palestinians, the reformist dominated parliament demanded an investigation to discover 
who had authorised the shipment. It clearly did not represent a consensual government 
position. Likewise, whilst Supreme Leader, Khamenai was condemning the Saudi 
peace initiative during Friday prayers, Iran's foreign minister, Kamal Kharrazi 
59 
'Iran's Khatami urges massive turnout on Quds Day', BBC Monitoring Service, (21st December 2000), 
[~Iobalarchive.tl:.com] 
6 Morton, E., Thinking Beyond the Stalemate in US-Iranian Relations: Volume 2- Issues and Analysis, 
(The Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington, July 2001), 
[ www .acus.org/publications/occasionalpapers ], p.49 
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described it as positive.62 During the recent Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank, 
Hizbollah activity on Israel's northern border threatened to escalate the conflict. Far 
from encouraging Hizbollah's actions, Kharrazi went to Lebanon to urge Hizbollah to 
exercise 'selfrestraint'. 63 Simply labelling Iran as a state sponsor ofterrorism does not 
take into account that there are many high up within government that strongly resist the 
policies of a hard line minority. 
2.3 Iran as a pursuer of weapons of mass destruction 
The issue cited most often as America's prime concern and the main justification for 
sanctions against Iran is Iran's supposed clandestine nuclear weapons program. 
Although the method and intensity of the program is disputed in America, Washington 
is convinced of Iran's intention to gain nuclear capability and has strong objections. 
Apart from an objection on general non-proliferation grounds, America fears a nuclear 
Iran would have a destabilising impact on the region and restrict America's options both 
militarily and politically in the event of a crisis. Washington's particular concern is 
Israel, of which Iran is openly opposed. A nuclear Iran would shift the balance of 
power away from America and Israel, giving Iran a substantially stronger position in the 
region. American and Israeli intelligence have given varying predictions of when Iran 
would have nuclear capability. Some reports predicted 2000, others longer. 2000 has 
now passed and the consensus is that Iran is still years away. 64 However if Iran is able 
to obtain weapons grade fissile material from outside Iran, possibly from the former 
Soviet Union, then some experts believe Iran could build some kind of nuclear weapon 
within nine to thirty-six months.65 
Many of Washington's policies towards Iran are directed at trying to prevent it from 
obtaining nuclear technology or equipment, even for a civilian nuclear energy program. 
The American's fear Iran will develop its nuclear capability under the cover of its 
civilian program. Their policy is twofold. Firstly US sanctions and vetoes on 
international organisations are designed to restrict the amount of money Iran has 
61 Ibid, p.54 
62 Dinmore, G., 'Violence reveals deep policy rifts', The Financial Times, (12 April 2002) 
63 Dinmore, G., 'Iran's centrists seek to break taboo of talk with US', (23 April2002) 
64 Traynor, 1., 'Kremlin's arms salesmen target US foes', The Guardian, (5 December 2000), 
[ www. guardianunlimited.co. uk!russia/artic le/0 ,2 7 63,406890,00] 
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available to pursue its nuclear program. Secondly the US applies considerable pressure 
on other countries not to supply any 'dual use' or missile technology and hardware to 
Iran. During the middle 90s this latter policy seemed successful, but now countries 
such as Russia, China and North Korea have resisted American pressure and have 
become Iran's major arms and (civilian) nuclear suppliers. Russia in particular, with its 
own declining nuclear program, has the expertise and economic incentive to be of 
considerable assistance to Iran. In 2000, Russia revoked a secret agreement, signed 
with the US in 1995, arguing that the benefits of arms trade with Iran far outweighed the 
potential costs imposed by America.66 Russia is also determined to help the Iranians 
complete a nuclear energy plant at Bushehr. 
There are two main contentions with respect to the American view of Iran's nuclear 
intentions. Firstly it is not absolutely clear that such a course is an intention or a 
priority for Iran. Secondly if such a determination does exist in Tehran, it is contestable 
that this would be a significant threat to American, regional and world security. There 
is no convincing evidence that Iran would use any nuclear capability in a threatening or 
aggressive manner. 
The Americans argue that the Iranians have clear motivations to go nuclear. The main 
focus of the Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy has always been the promotion of 
an independent and self-sufficient Iran. 67 A nuclear capability would not only boost 
national pride but also decrease Iran's reliance on other countries for military supplies. 
The Iran-Iraq War of the 80s left Iran's military dangerously under equipped and 
supplied. In the last battles of the war, Iran is estimated to have lost 40 to 50% of its 
major ground force equipment, the navy suffered significant losses and Iran has been 
unable to effectively re-supply weapons and machinery supplied by the west during the 
time of Shah.68 To re-equip effectively, Iran needs huge investment and supplies from 
abroad. Given Iran's economic situation and given the pressure America puts on 
countries not to supply Iran, some analysts believe Iran would prefer the nuclear 
65 Cordesman, A. & Hashim, A., Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment, p.306 
66 Traynor, I., 'Kremlin's arms salesmen target US foes' 
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option.69 A nuclear capability would instantly boost defence to a level that would make 
costly rearmament of the military less of a priority. The US argues that for these 
reasons, even the pragmatists in the Iranian government, such as Khatami, would 
support a nuclear program. Michael Eisenstadt from the Washington Institute of 
International Affairs says of the Khatami faction: "While these men are pragmatists, 
they are also Persian nationalists, interested in building a strong Iran ... In this light, it 
seems plausible that Khatami and his entourage would support the acquisition of such 
weapons." 70 
Washington also claims that the more Islamic elements in Tehran would also support a 
nuclear capability because it would enhance Iran's standing in the Islamic World and 
increase Iran's ability to influence regional issues. Eisenstadt claims: "Iran's clerical 
leaders believe that the Islamic Republic plays a key role in world affairs as the standard 
bearer of revolutionary Islam and the guardians of oppressed Muslims everywhere. 
Accordingly, they believe that the fate of the world-wide Islamic community depends 
on Iran's ability to transform into a military power that can defend and advance the 
interests ofthe community."71 
Iran on the other hand resolutely denies any nuclear intention. The more pragmatic side 
argues that a nuclear program would not be in the national interest. It would severely 
damage attempts to gain international recognition and reputation and therefore access to 
global markets. Furthermore, with a struggling economy, Iran maintains that the funds 
are better spent elsewhere. The Iran-Iraq War, the large influx of refugees from Iraq, 
Azerbaijan and Afghanistan, a population explosion and foreign sanctions have left the 
Iranian economy in severe difficulties. For example, GDP per capita fell sharply from 
$1630 in 1985 to $1000 in 1992.72 Unemployment is also major problem, particularly 
amongst the disproportionately young population. It is estimated that: "the economy 
will have to generate 800,000 jobs per year to accommodate new entrants into the job 
69 See Eisenstadt, M., 'Living with a Nuclear Iran', Survival, vol. 41, no. 3 (1999), pp.l24-148 and 
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market ... approximately 450,000 jobs beyond the economy's current job-creating 
capacity." 73 
Declared Iranian policy on weapons of mass destruction is the promotion of non-
proliferation. Having experienced directly the suffering caused by biological and 
chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran claims to be vehemently against 
their use or development, even proposing at one point a nuclear-free Middle East. Iran 
is a signatory of both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) and allows the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) to regularly inspect its nuclear facilities. America dismisses the latter, arguing 
that these inspections are pre-arranged and are only of declared sites. However Iran has 
implied that it will sign the IAEA's Model Safeguards Protocol, allowing inspection of 
undeclared sites, if America stops interfering with the civilian program (which Iran is 
entitled to pursue under the terms of the NPT). 74 
Numerous leaders in the Iranian government, past and present, have spoken out against 
nuclear proliferation, not only for the national interest but also for religious and moral 
reasons. Khomeini himself declared his opposition, arguing that they were 
indiscriminate and therefore contrary to Islam. This view still carries considerable 
weight in Tehran. Iran's foreign minister, Kharrazi said in September 1997: "The 
Islamic Republic of Iran, on the basis of Islamic beliefs, considers WMD inhumane and 
illegitimate. "75 
The second main contention to US claims is the extent to which a nuclear Iran would be 
a threat. Given that the priority for Iran seems to be economic recovery and therefore 
international respectability and regional stability, it would be counterproductive for Iran 
to break out of the NPT and CWC and go against its public stance of non-proliferation. 
What is more likely is that Iran will make some effort to increase levels of nuclear 
understanding and equipment, probably under cover of its civilian program, so that 
when a crisis arises, like Iraq declaring nuclear capability, Iran will be not be too far 
behind. Following his own investigations, Gary Sick believes: "Iran is probably 
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developing the underlying infrastructure that would permit it to mount a fully fledged 
nuclear-weapons programme at relatively short notice if it should find itself threatened 
by . . . a direct nuclear threat. At the moment, this not a crash programme and is not 
given very high priority."76 
There is no convmcmg evidence that Iran desires to use a nuclear capability for 
anything other than defence. In recent years there has been no suggestion of aggressive 
regional ambitions. In fact Iran's regional policy has been the opposite: based on co-
operation and the building and maintenance of stability. The emphasis oflran's foreign 
policy has always been on independence and territorial integrity but, as Khatami is 
quick to point out: "We will not interfere in the affairs of others ... we are in favour of 
extensive co-operation with our neighbours, with Muslims and with all independent 
countries."77 Iran has very real and justified defence concerns and therefore legitimate 
reasons for considering the nuclear option. 
Regional realities makes it necessary for Iran to have a strong defence capability. Iran 
is surrounded by Iraq, which has already shown its propensity for unprovoked 
aggression, Afghanistan, which until very recently was under a hostile regime, 
harbouring hostile terrorist groups, Azerbaijan and Armenia who violently disputed 
their borders until 1994 and the United Arab Emirates who have laid claim to three 
Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf. Further afield, Iran's relationship with Israel is very 
antagonistic and for the past decade there has been significant political unrest in 
Tajikistan. The Gulf countries to the south are protected by America's nuclear 
umbrella. India and Pakistan have recently tested nuclear missiles and Israel also has a 
nuclear capability. The concept of non-proliferation in the region is already a farce. 
Extensive militarisation in the region plus severe damage during the Iran-Iraq war has 
left Iran in a comparatively weak position. Iran has spent far less on arms than most of 
the region and has also been left out of security pacts, leaving it isolated and vulnerable. 
Whilst the Gulf states (excluding Iraq) spent about $157 billion on their military forces 
between 1989 to 1992, the CIA estimated in 1992 that Iran was only spending $2 billion 
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annually on arms imports.78 Some Iranian officials have implied that to have any hope 
of retaliating against such might, Iran must have a nuclear capacity. In 1993, Iran 
Defence Minister said: "Can our air force ... take on the Americans, or our navy take on 
the American navy? If we put all our country's budget into such a war we would have 
just burnt our money. The way to go about dealing with such a threat requires a 
different solution entirely."79 In June 1998 Judiciary Chief Ayatollah Mohammad 
Yazdi stated: "we are living at [a] time when the United States supports Israel which has 
the biggest arsenals of the mass destruction and nuclear weapons [and] atomic power is 
needed in the world oflslam to create a balance in the region."80 
As Fuller points out, the threat of WMD comes not from the weapons themselves but 
the regime in control of them.81 Pragmatists such as Khatami have been consistent in 
their desire for a responsible foreign policy to promote stability, co-operation and 
recognition. However, to say that the threat is negligible because the government of 
Iran will not pursue aggressive regional policies is to ignore the powers of other groups 
in the regime. It is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that is reportedly in 
charge of Iran's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes and missile 
forces. 82 The commander of the IRGC allegedly voiced opposition to the government 
stance in a leaked meeting in April 1998: "Can we withstand America's threats and 
domineering attitude with a policy of detente? ... Will we be able to protect the Islamic 
Republic from international Zionism by signing conventions to ban proliferation of 
chemical and nuclear weapons?"83 However not only is it very unlikely that the IRGC 
have a free reign over any nuclear weapons programme, reports suggest that the same 
proportion of the IRGC voted for Khatami in the 1997 election as the rest of the 
population. This would suggest that the IRGC are not the hard-line bastion they are 
made out to be. Furthermore, there is considerable precedence for such comments 
being leaked from the conservative establishment to embarrass and hinder moderate 
government policies. The Iran Contra Affair was exposed by Iranian conservative 
elements, angry at the deals being made with the US and in 1989 revolutionary 
ideologues used the Rushdie Affair to derail suspected secret negotiations with the 
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US.84 It is not inconceivable that threatening comments made with regard to the use of 
WMD are merely similar attempts to mar Khatami's reconciliation efforts. That they 
represent real Iranian intentions is highly dubious. 
In short, if Iran is pursuing a nuclear programme, it is not a fast track programme with 
considerable finance. More likely is the scenario that Iran is keeping its options open, 
which, given regional circumstances, is not totally unexpected. If the region was to 
aspire to non-proliferation, if Iran was included in the various security pacts and if the 
US was to reduce its military presence in the region, it would never be in Iran's interests 
to take any nuclear programme to the next level. 
2.4 Iran and the Region 
The reason the US is so concerned about Iran gaining WMD or having close links with 
Islamic opposition groups stems from the belief that Iran has dangerous regional and 
ideological ambitions. The two main American interests in the region, oil production 
and the security of Israel, make this possibility particularly poignant. Since the post 
revolutionary policy of exporting the revolution, many of the secular states in the region 
and their US guardians have been considerably wary of Iran's intentions. Situations, 
such as the alleged support of thwarted coups in Bahrain in 1981 and 1996 and the 
disturbances during the annual Hajj in Saudi Arabia in the 80's, only confirmed to the 
world that Iran was seeking to undermine these western orientated, monarchical and 
secular states. If successful this would have had grave consequences for western oil 
interests. The governments of these Gulf and North African states were only too aware 
that serious tensions between secular and Islamic elements already existed amongst 
their populations. They feared that Iran would manipulate these to their own advantage. 
As late as 1995 a report on US security strategy by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defence declared: "Iran harbours ambitions of establishing Iranian hegemony over the 
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Persian Gulf and expanding its influence over radical Islamist forces." 85 However, 
since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, most analysts and world governments have 
recognised that economic and social pressures have forced revolution-spreading to the 
bottom of the Iranian agenda. Reintegration into the international fold became essential 
to the sustainability of the Islamic Republic. It is primarily for this reason that in recent 
years, Iran has been promoting good relationships with its neighbours and striving for 
regional stability. Iran is also aware that by working with other states, it is able to 
undermine America's position in the region much more effectively. Not only can 
Tehran encourage anti American, nationalist sentiment, but the friendly approach 
removes one of the primary justifications for the Gulfs heavy reliance on American 
military protection. This new direction is potentially more threatening to US interests 
than Iran's previous behaviour. After all, a divided region is far easier to manipulate 
and rule over than a region that is co-operating towards regional economic, political and 
military strength and stability. Khatami restated this policy in a speech to the Iranian 
Majlis in March 2001: "We have no aggressive intentions towards anyone ... We have 
been also trying to promote and practise an active and conciliatory policy of detente 
which has made it very difficult to justify the presence of foreign forces in the Persian 
Gulf."86 
Evidence of Iran's positive contribution to world and regional interests comes in three 
main areas. Firstly Iran has been involved constructively in the solution of a number of 
conflicts, namely Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. Secondly Iran has made considerable 
efforts to improve relations with all its neighbours, entering into negotiations on many 
points of conflict. Finally developments in Iran's domestic politics have had a positive 
impact on the development of ideas of civil society and democratic principles in the 
region. Iran has the potential to become the first ever Islamic democracy and should be 
held up as a possible model for other Muslim states. 
2.4.1 Involvement in Conflicts 
The dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh in the early 90s 
was a huge security concern to Iran. Iran has good relations with Armenia and several 
85 Cordesman, A. & Hashim, A., Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment, p.l25 
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resident Armenian communities. There is also a sizeable Azeri minority in the north 
west of Iran. The conflict threatened to spill over into Iran several times. Tehran 
therefore consistently made efforts to mediate between the two. The first ceasefire was 
negotiated in Tehran in March 1993. President Rafsanjani said at the time: "the Islamic 
Republic of Iran has, from the very start of tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia, 
initiated extensive efforts to prevent the fanning of differences and reach a peaceful 
solution. While always remaining on the sideline, we have called on the two countries 
to find political solutions to their differences and refrain from bloodshed and war."87 
Whilst it is true that Iran mainly supported Armenia against Azerbaijan, when 
Armenia's aggression became unacceptable, Iran appealed to the UN to condemn 
Armenia and even mobilised troops to deter them from attacking the Nakhichevan 
enclave. 88 Iran played a constructive role in maintaining the balance of power in the 
region and thereby helped bring about a viable ceasefire. 
Similarly in Tajikistan Iran also played a part in the peace initiative. Iran's Deputy 
Foreign Minister for Education and Research of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Abbas 
Maleki claims: "the signing of the Tajikistan Peace Agreement in Tehran was a 
historical event and the result of constructive dialogue and contacts in which the Islamic 
Republic of Iran played a key role. "89 
It is in Afghanistan however that Iran has been most involved. The criticism often 
levelled at Iran and the other states involved in Afghanistan's civil war was that their 
interference aggravated and prolonged the conflict. Iran initially supported only the 
Shi'ite Hazara minority in Afghanistan but after the government of Najibullah fell in 
1992 and the Taliban emerged, Iran increased its support to all Persian speaking 
peoples, including the Sunni Tajiks and Uzbeks. Iran saw the 'Northern Alliance' as it 
was called, as crucial to prevent a US, Saudi and Pakistani backed, anti-Iranian 
government from gaining and maintaining power in Kabul. Tehran therefore helped the 
Northern Alliance with arms, financial and moral support. 
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Contrary to criticism, Iran's involvement in Afghanistan cannot be described as merely 
provocative and unconstructive. As it happened Tehran had legitimate reasons to 
oppose a Tali ban government in Afghanistan. When the Tali ban took Mazar-e-Sharif in 
1998 thousands of civilian Shi'ites were massacred including seven Iranian diplomats. 
Iran mobilised its troops on the border. The Economist reported at the time: "far from 
apologising for the Shia massacre, the Taliban have been defiant, threatening to 'target 
Iranian cities' if attacked. "90 The Tali ban also proceeded to provide safe havens for 
terrorist groups targeting Iran and went against a pledge to stop poppy production. The 
latter was detrimental to Iran's worsening drug associated problems. By the end of the 
century, eighty percent of the world's opium was cultivated in Afghanistan and most 
passed through Iran.91 Drug smuggling made gun culture prolific in many parts of 
eastern Iran and over the last twenty years three thousand members of the security 
forces have been killed trying to prevent the trade. The volume of drugs has also led to 
a very high addiction rate with over three million heroin addicts in Iran. 92 
The continuing war in Afghanistan has also left a tremendous refugee burden on Iran, 
whose economy is already suffering. Iran has the largest refugee population in the 
world, which in 1998 stood at almost two million, the majority of which were 
Afghans.93 It is clear that it was in Iran's national interest to resolve the situation in 
Afghanistan not prolong it. Through the UN's '6+2' committee and the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC), Iran has consistently worked to do just that. Post 
September 11th and throughout the 'War on Terrorism', Iran's commitment to a stable 
Afghanistan has remained. Alongside the coalition, Tehran has been unwavering in its 
support for the establishment of a 'democratic broad-based government' in Kabul.94 
Iran was instrumental in getting an agreement on an interim government at the 
negotiations in Bonn. Far from merely backing the 'Northern Alliance', Iranian 
officials applied considerable pressure to get them to agree to a multi ethnic 
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government.95 At a conference in Tokyo held to discuss the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan, Iran pledged to give $550 million over the next five years, more than any 
other third world country.96 Even the US State Department seemed pleased with Iran's 
involvement, testifying in Congress that Iran was playing a constructive role in 
Afghanistan. 
More recently the US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfield, accused Iran of 
allowing Al-Qaeda fighters to flee Afghanistan through Iran and there have also been 
reports that war lords formerly allied to Tehran has been attempting to undermine the 
new interim government in Kabul. However if such reports are genuine, then it is 
highly probably that rogue elements in the Iranian regime, such as some Revolutionary 
Guards, are to blame. Iran's official position remains supportive of US action against 
Al-Qaeda and of the Kabul Administration. 
2.4.2 Relations with Neighbours 
The increasingly pragmatic approach to foreign policy has culminated in the re-
establishment of relations with Saudi Arabia, Russia, and other states on the Caspian 
and in the Persian Gulf. When Khatami was elected in 1997 one of his first moves was 
to make the promotion of good regional relations a foreign policy priority. At the 
eighth summit of the leadership of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
held in Tehran in December 1997, both factions in Iranian politics, represented by 
President Khatami and Supreme Leader Khamenai, used the opportunity to launch a 
conciliatory message to the other fifty five member states. Reassuring neighbouring 
states of Iran's lack of aggressive regional ambition, Khatami stated: "Internationally ... 
our civil society neither seeks to dominate others nor to submit to domination."97 
Khamenai reinforced this saying: "Iran poses no threat to any Islamic country."98 
During this conference crucial bilateral discussions took place on many points of 
conflict, opening the way for ever closer relations over the coming years. 
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Considerable regional difficulties do remain, such as the distribution of oil and gas 
rights in the Caspian, Iran's occupation of the Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser 
Tunb islands claimed by the UAE and links between factions in Iran and the Hizbollah 
and other Shi'ite organisations. However Iran has shown considerable willing to 
negotiate and resolve all of these issues. Abbas Maleki, deputy foreign minister for 
education and research in Iran, states the Iranian position on the islands: "Dialogue 
without preconditions over the Tunb and Abu Musa islands was ... raised by Iran and 
Foreign Minister Velayati even paid a visit to the UAE ... We consider this problem to 
be resolvable through bilateral negotiations."99 
Iran traditionally does see itself as a major player in the region and seeks greater 
regional power. However, it does not necessarily follow that Iran wishes to completely 
dominate and subvert the whole region. Iran is a major player and has every right to 
expect that to be borne out in regional politics. There is no evidence to suggest that the 
relations Iran is building up both economically and militarily with other states is any 
more than just a desire on Iran's part to become involved and influential in the region 
once more. President Rafsanjani stated back in 1993: "We strongly deny the 
proposition that Iran has plans to become the region's superpower. A comparison of 
Iran's arms spending with that of other regional states reveals this ... Time and again 
we have displayed our seriousness in defending ourselves. However, we have no 
intention of invading our neighbours, and these countries should not fear attack from 
Iran."100 The fact that the region seems to have begun the process of reconciliation with 
Iran is evidence that they have put the difficult time of the 80s and early 90s behind 
them. For the United States however, a regional reconciliation with Iran conflicts with 
its own interests in the region. Iran has been openly pushing for a US military 
withdrawal and has the potential to rival the US as the major regional economic and 
political influence. It is therefore hardly surprising that the US is desperate to 
perpetuate a negative and aggressive image of Iran in the region. 
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2.5 Human Rights 
The US concern over Iran's human rights record takes a low priority. It is often tacked 
onto the other concerns with little justification or evidence. Whereas much has been 
written about the first three accusations, human rights is merely touched on. It is true 
that conservative elements in Iran have attacked various areas of the press, including 
imprisoning journalists and opposition politicians. It is also true that Iran's 
governmental system could never be described as democratic in the western sense. 
Potential candidates are vetted by the Council of Guardians and only allowed to stand if 
they are considered suitable for Islamic government. The Council of Guardians, headed 
by the supreme leader, also vets potential laws, vetoing them if they are considered 
unlslamic. Having said that, after vetting, the president and parliament are directly 
elected by the people. The massive support for both President Khatami and the 
reformers in parliament in recent elections have given both a popular legitimacy that 
cannot be ignored by conservatives in the Council of Guardians or the judiciary. In no 
uncertain terms could Iran be described as a dictatorship or a totalitarian society. 
Although the press is sometimes stifled, new papers merely emerge. Considerable 
political debate remains and people talk politics freely. These democratic elements in 
Iran exist in stark contrast to other states in the region, such as Egypt , Saudi Arabia and 
the rest of the GCC. 
Some of Iran's laws and punishments, particularly those based in Islam, such as public 
hanging, the law against adultery or the restrictive dress code for women are viewed by 
many in the West as against universal human rights. If applied to western standards, 
then this may be the case. However if compared to other countries in the region and in 
fact the world, Iran's human rights record suddenly becomes glowing. The US has 
willingly constructed relations with countries such as China, arguing that they can 
influence human rights more effectively with engagement not isolation. This argument 
could easily be applied to the case of Iran. As for the US criticism of Islamic law, this 
becomes farcical when one considers American alliances with Saudi Arabia and other 
Gulf states. 
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3. THE CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT 
The perception of Iran painted in chapter 2 is a far cry from the one painted in the US, 
where Iran is viewed as an irrational rogue state desperate to empower Muslims by 
violently and ideologically attacking the western world. Opinions on Iranian behaviour 
are clearly heavily subjective, undermining the idea that US policy towards Iran is based 
solely on Realism. To understand the current relationship, it is crucial to examine how 
and why this perception of Iran has occurred and what effect this perception has had on 
policy. 
Since American involvement in Iran after the Second World War a series of grievances 
on both sides have aggravated relations. These grievances have in turn been aggravated 
by both country's ideological and historical perspectives. For example, Iran's past has 
given rise to a deep suspicion of Great Powers and a determination to protect their 
independence. America, meanwhile, has developed a superpower mentality. Their 
consequent sense of cultural, economic and political superiority is resented by a 
suspicious and proud Iran. 
The difficulties in the relationship cannot however, be understood by merely listing both 
sides' sets of historical grievances. Conflicts and disputes between states are an 
everyday occurrence and are reconciled over time. The significant grievances in the 
American Iranian case occurred in the past. There is a new generation growing up with 
no memory of the Revolution, the hostage crisis, the 1953 coup or the Shah. Why, 
therefore are Iran and American unable to discuss and settle their differences? The 
failure of rapprochement is not notable in itself but the total absence of any such process 
is remarkable. This can be explained by the existence of a lengthy and deep-rooted 
process of ideological antagonism and demonisation, which has prevented either side 
from compromising. Over time the idea of Iran and America as representing competing 
and opposing hegemonies or world views has been constructed and become entrenched. 
3.1 The Origins of Iran's Animosity 
The origins of Iran's animosity towards America lie in its own historical ideological 
basis. Iran has a history of strength and power. Since the early days of the Persian 
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Empire, Iran has ruled over a number of empires, the last being the Safavid Empire four 
hundred years ago. Since then Iran has struggled to maintain its independence against 
the growing strength of Europe and the US. Slowly but surely economic concessions 
were made to European business, such as the Reuter's Concession of 1872 and Iran was 
divided into spheres of influence by Russia and Britain in an agreement in 1907. When 
Reza Khan, as he was then called, emerged on the scene he was feted as the man who 
would restore Iran's independence and national pride. Reza Shah's policy of 
modernisation and westernisation however lost him his nationalist credentials and there 
was little opposition to his removal by the Allies in 1941. In 1941 the Allies invaded 
Iran, capturing it in just a few days. Iran's national army was humiliated and Iran took 
another blow to its national pride. The Shah's son Muhammad Reza was placed on the 
throne by the Allies and they left leaving behind a legacy of dependence that 
Muhammad Reza Shah found difficult to throw off. Suspicions and resentment of th~ 
influence of Great Powers and a desire to be independent and powerful once more is 
firmly etched onto the Iranian mindset. It is this mindset that remained when America 
appeared on the Iranian scene in the early 1950s. 
3.1.1 The Oil Nationalisation Crisis and Coup of 1953 
America first became closely involved in Iran during the Oil Nationalisation Crisis of 
the early 50s. The Anglo Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), based in Abadan, was Britain's 
largest overseas concession, bringing in a huge income. However Iran was receiving 
very little benefit from the AIOC's monopoly in Iran. In 1950 the AIOC earned £200 
million from its Iranian assets, only £16 million of which was given to the Iranian 
govemment. 101 Even more humiliating for Iranian nationalists was the loss of 
sovereignty that the AIOC represented. To all intents and purposes, Abadan was a 
British enclave. Resentment grew dramatically towards the British and it was in this 
environment that the National Front was set up. 
The National Front was a coalition of secular liberals led by Muhammad Mosaddeq, 
bazaar merchants, clergy led by Ayatollah Kashani and socialists. Gradually the 
National Front increased its influence in parliament and in March 1951 Mosaddeq 
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submitted a bill to nationalise the AIOC. It was passed and Mosaddeq soon became 
Prime Minister. Mosaddeq increasingly played the nationalist card and moved slowly 
to decrease the powers of the Shah, in favour of the democratically elected parliament. 
The British reacted badly to the nationalisation of the AIOC and flatly refused to 
negotiate. A world-wide ban on Iranian oil was imposed, paratroops were sent to 
Cyprus and British navy ships arrived in Abadan. The British also began covert action 
designed to overthrow Mosaddeq. At first the Americans did not support the British 
and asked them to negotiate. When Mosaddeq carne to New York to discuss the 
situation with the UN, he travelled to Washington where he "was received warmly by 
President Truman and other US officials." 102 
The situation changed when Eisenhower was elected President. Anti-Communist 
fervour was at its height and US officials became increasingly concerned about the 
influence of Iran's communist party, Tudeh. The British persuaded the United States 
that Mosaddeq was a communist and the Americans became set on ousting him. In 
August 1953, the Americans took advantage of divisions within the National Front and 
launched a coup. Using covert forces and bribery, the United States successfully 
removed Mosaddeq from power and reinstated the Shah's authority. In doing so, they 
made Mosaddeq a martyr to the nationalist cause and began the notion that the Shah's 
power was dependent on American involvement. The coup represents a major Iranian 
grievance towards America and is the origin of the Iranian belief that America is 
imperialist. 
3.1.2 The American-Iranian alliance: US support for the Shah 
After the 1953 coup, the US remained closely involved in Iran. The relationship 
between America and Iran was cultivated by both sides. The Shah needed America's 
support to follow his policy of rapid modernisation and to fulfil his desire for Iran to be 
the main economic and military power in the region. America needed a way of 
guaranteeing the security of its interests in the Gulf, namely oil transport and also 
needed Iran as a strategic ally to counter the Soviet Union. As the pressures of the Cold 
102 Gasiorowski, M.G., 'The 1953 Coup D'Etat in Iran', International Journal ofMiddle Eastern Studies, 
vol. 19 (1987), p. 268 
46 
War increased, it became more and more crucial to America that Iran did not become 
socialist. For this reason, the US provided Iran with considerable economic and 
military aid after the coup. For example, "the Eisenhower Administration extended 
over $600 million in economic aid and another nearly $4.5 million in military aid."103 
Iran, like many other Middle Eastern states became a client state of America and the 
Shah became the US's puppet. For Iranian nationalists, both secular and religious, this 
American domination was difficult to accept. 
Conscious of the wanmg of his own power during the Mosaddeq era, the Shah 
developed a system of autocracy and personal power. He relied mainly on a policy of 
'carrot and sticks'. The 'carrot' was largely a system of patronage where his supporters 
were given large economic favours and the 'stick' was largely the Shah's personal 
secret service called SA V AK. The United States helped set up SA V AK in 1957 and 
continued to provide the Shah with American intelligence. By the 1970s the Shah had 
almost completely abandoned the 'carrot' in favour of the 'stick' and a decade of 
repression set in. "Domestically, SA VAK was viewed as a police-state monster, and as 
its tactics became more extreme and ruthless, it acquired an unsavoury reputation not 
only in Iran but throughout the world." 104 America's personal support for the Shah, 
despite his repressive policies, meant that the United States was a clear target for 
domestic opposition in Iran. Along with economic disparity and recession, the 
revolution of 1979 was largely a reaction against the Shah's autocracy and American 
interference. The resentment against America for removing the one figure (Mosaddeq) 
that was seen to truly represent the interests of the Iranian people and replacing him 
with a secular, repressive dictator clearly remain today. 
3.1.3 The Iran-Iraq War 
Throughout the war, American policy had been to play Iraq and Iran off against one 
another to prevent either from becoming too powerful in the region. However by 1986, 
Iran was on the verge of winning the war. Fearing a strong Iran, the US intervened on 
behalf of the Iraqis, destroying much of the Iranian navy and many oil installations. On 
3 July 1988, the US navy accidentally shot down an Iranian airliner killing almost three 
hundred civilians, further fuelling anti-American resentment. 
103 Ramazani, R.K., The United States and Iran. (Praeger, New York 1982), p. 55 
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3.1.4 1990s and Beyond 
Current perceptions of the US have been heavily influenced by these past events. 
Suspicions of America's intentions in the region and towards Iran remain strong. Iran is 
only too aware, to its cost, of the military and economic muscle America is capable of 
wielding. Events, such as the speaker of Congress, Newt Gingrich allocating $20 
million to the CIA to overthrow the Iranian government in 1995, are seen as proof that 
the US is determined to destroy the Islamic Republic of Iran and re-impose a puppet 
ruler. More recently a leaked Pentagon document named Iran as one of seven countries 
that America considered potential nuclear targets. Events such as these and antagonistic 
rhetoric from the US has been used as further proof to Iranian revolutionary ideologues 
that America is the number one enemy of Iran. Although most of the Iranian population 
draw a distinction between US government policy and the US people, wanting to 
engage with the latter, many remam wary of direct government to government 
communication. Under no circumstances is Iran in a position to openly concede 
anything to the Americans. Independence and national pride remain paramount. Iran is 
looking to negotiate with the US only on equal terms and will do anything to avoid 
domination by what they see as an imperialist superpower. The Tehran Times 
interviewed the director of the Tehran Times Institute who summed up general opinion 
in Iran as the following: 
"In order to have a fruitful dialogue three conditions are necessary. First, both sides 
should be honest in their negotiations. Secondly, negotiations should be held on an 
equal footing. And thirdly, no side should use threats during the course of dialogue. At 
the moment the United States is not a sincere well-wisher and only favours a one-sided 
dialogue. In this situation, in which the United States has threatened to use nuclear 
weapons against Iran, any recommendation to start negotiations with the United States 
is not in line with the national interests of the country." 105 
105 
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3.2 The US View 
As the previous section shows, the roots of the hegemonic contest clearly precede the 
1979 Revolution. Iran over time constructed strong feelings of paranoia, suspicion and 
resentment of the US and thus emerged challenging and opposing the American system. 
The 1979 Revolution was America's first taste of this independent and hostile Iran and 
shocked and horrified. The consequent events only confirmed and solidified the idea of 
a hegemonic contest in the minds of both Americans and Iranians. The behaviour and 
policies of Iran during the first decade of the Revolution established and reinforced the 
belief that an Islamic Iran would be an opponent of America's world hegemonic order. 
As Baylis and Smith point out, "the Iranian Revolution continued to haunt the Western 
imagination, even though the Islamic Republic gradually ceased to be the Revolutionary 
force that it once was."106 Iran came to be viewed, not only as an outsider to America's 
world order, but also as an incomprehensible menace, determined to undermine its very 
essence. 
The prevalence of Orientalist and neo-Orientalist ideas further contributed to the 
perception of an Islamic Iran being inherently unable to join America's hegemony. 
Widely accepted typecasts of Islam and Islamic societies, born out of the Orientalist 
tradition in the West, portray Muslims as the Other, unable to accept ideas of liberal 
democracy, capitalism and modernisation. There is little acceptance of the idea that 
Islamic societies have the potential to take on the ethos of democratic and western 
thought, merely adjusting it to fit particular environments and circumstances. Most 
would not go as far as Huntington in suggesting that a clash of Islamic and Christian 
civilisations is inevitable, because there are many examples of countries in the Middle 
East working within the world order and incorporating western ideas such as 
secularisation into their societies. Turkey and Egypt being notable examples. Iran 
however poses an altogether different question. Can a government based so heavily on 
Islam ever operate within and accept the dominant world order or will it inherently 
contradict and oppose it? 
106 Baylis, J. & Smith, Smith, S., The Globalization of World Politics: an Introduction to International 
Relations, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998), p.388 
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3.2.1 The 'Islamic' Revolution 
Despite the Shah's contentious domestic policies, especially in the 1970s, the Carter 
Administration was desperate to maintain the special relationship. Iran now accounted 
for half of America's arms sales, was the second largest oil producer in the world and 
remained crucial to the US in maintaining stability and US influence in the Gulf. To 
Carter and his Administration, the Revolution came as a shock and was a massive 
foreign policy disaster. Overnight the Islamic Revolution of 1979 transformed Iran 
from America's number one ally in the Persian Gulfto its number one enemy. 
Whilst it is true that the Revolution in Iran represented an enormous strategic blow to 
the US, this is not enough to explain the level of antagonism that emerged between the 
two countries over the coming decades. The Americans lost a close ally in the Shah, 
and with him their means to control the Persian Gulf region, however this was not an 
insurmountable problem. The US military were in a position to and did take over the 
Shah's role as the regional policeman. Other revolutions and coups have overthrown 
friends of America but never has this led to the strength of animosity felt towards Iran. 
The Revolution was clearly more than just a practical, strategic blow for the Americans; 
it represented the start of a long lasting complex ideological conflict, which has proved 
extremely difficult to unravel. 
There are four main reasons why the Revolution was viewed and continues to be 
viewed so negatively and threateningly in the US, thereby sowing the seeds of long 
lasting ideological antagonism. Firstly, strong anti-American feeling was a large 
feature of Iran's revolutionary ideology. Secondly, due to a lack of communication and 
reliable information, the American Administration misunderstood various elements of 
the Revolution and therefore reacted very negatively. Thirdly, prolific negative 
stereotyping of Islam and the increasing concern in the US over the general threat posed 
by political Islam meant that the Islamic element of the Revolution was greeted with the 
utmost suspicion and horror. Finally, a revolutionary ideology with hegemonic 
aspirations dominated Iranian politics in the first decade of the Islamic Republic. This 
ideology was openly anti the world system and especially against the power of its 
leaders, the US and the USSR. Worryingly for the US, the Revolution had the potential 
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to appeal to all the third world, as Iran attempted to take on the position of leader of the 
'oppressed' against the 'oppressors.' 107 
3.2.2 Anti-Americanism 
From the very beginning, Anti-Americanism played a maJor role in forming 
revolutionary ideology. It was a significant ideological element that unified all the 
initial opposition forces: the nationalists, the communists and the Islamists. Opposition 
towards America was therefore emphasised and played on. United States' interests 
were direct targets of the revolutionaries. Attacks included many of the three hundred 
American companies based in Iran and culminated in the taking over of the US embassy 
in November 1979. Following Carter's admission of the Shah to the US for medical 
treatment, huge anti-American demonstrations occurred in Tehran. 'Death to America' 
was shouted as feelings continued to run high. On 41h November 1979 five hundred 
extremist students stormed the embassy and took sixty-one Americans hostage. In April 
1980 a US rescue attempt failed and the crisis lasted a further year. 
Prior to the hostage crisis there had been some debate in the US over policy options 
towards Iran. The hostage crisis however confirmed to hardliners and persuaded 
conciliators that the Iranian Revolution was a significant threat to the US and 
consequently must be condemned and controlled. The extensive coverage of the 
hostage crisis by the American media meant that the whole nation watched the 
unfolding events, experiencing first hand the total humiliation and complete horror at 
what was happening. Dr Gary Sick, an American academic and former Carter official 
(NSC staff member for Iran and assistant to Brzezinski during the crisis), said in an 
interview: 
"The overall perception of Iran is shaped by the Iranian Revolution and the hostage 
crisis. Those were the determining events as far as US policy towards Iran. That was 
true twenty years ago and it is true today ... It has a huge impact. ... That created the 
image of a ruthless, lawless state that was out of control and was absolutely committed 
107 Khomeini often referred to this Marxist idea, putting it in a Shi' ite context. He seemed to be referring 
to all oppressed peoples, not just Muslims and saw the oppressors as the two superpowers. See Rajaee, 
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to an anti-American position and was also prepared to humiliate the United States. And 
that has never ... really changed."108 
Not only have the American public never forgotten the images on their television 
screens, but more damagingly, individuals in the Carter Administration have harboured 
these negative experiences, carrying them with them throughout their political careers. 
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State from 1993 to 1997, for example, was involved 
in the lengthy negotiations for the release of the hostages and never forgave 
revolutionary Iran for the damage they did to the Carter Presidency and the prestige of 
the US. His views on Iran, according to some verged on obsessive. According to 
Gerges, "foreign diplomats reported that when discussing Iran, Christopher's subtle and 
judicious manner vanished and his eyes flashed. Some European diplomats accused 
him of being motivated in part by vengeance." 109 
The taking of western hostages by Lebanese Hizbollah, an Iranian prodigy, during the 
1980s and the consequent debacle of the Iran Contra Affair were also highly publicised 
in the American media. America was once again publicly humiliated by Revolutionary 
Iran. Coupled with memories of the Embassy take-over, these events only reinforced 
the image of Iran as a dangerous, unreliable, enemy of America in the minds of 
politicians and the public. Iran was the first nation, previously ideologically allied to 
the US to tum against the US's hegemony so openly and defiantly. 
3.2.3 Misinformation, misunderstandings ... 
The Americans for their part were surprised by the dramatic changes in Iran and 
therefore reacted unconstructively. The closeness of the US government to the Shah of 
Iran meant that the US were shielded from the worsening domestic situation in Iran 
during the 1970s. They were unaware of the extent of the Shah's increasing need for 
repression of his opposition and thus unprepared for the magnitude of the oncoming 
uprising by the Iranian people. Carter is quoted as saying a month before the Shah was 
finally overthrown, "I fully expect the Shah to maintain power in Iran and for the 
F., Islamic Values and World View: Khomeyni on Man, the State, and International Politics, (New York, 
1983), p.79 
108 Interview with Gary Sick, Columbia University, (New York, II March 2002); see also interview with 
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present problems to be resolved." 110 American officials both in Iran and the US were ill 
informed and the Shah himself did nothing to portray the true picture to the US. James 
Bill suggests that "powerful Pahlavi supporters in the United States sought to discredit 
the revolution by portraying the revolutionaries as uncivilised, barbaric, and fanatical 
and the revolution itself as a fleeting aberration that lacked the support of the Iranian 
people." 111 Even after the Revolution, the Carter Administration refused to 
acknowledge the genuine popularity of the Islamic elements in the revolution, especially 
Khomeini. They chose to deal solely with the more moderate interim government of 
Barzagan, writing off the Islamists as "irrational" and "crazy". 112 The US's refusal to 
construct relations with Khomeini meant misperceptions and misunderstandings 
continued to be rife. 
R.K. Ramazani describes the period leading up to the revolution as "the twin revolution 
of rising alienation,"113 referring to total disenchantment with the Shah because of his 
alliance with the US, economic disparity and worsening repression. However, to the 
US, the revolution was not seen as a nationalist movement against foreign imperialism. 
Nor was it seen in the context of a history of popular uprisings against unjust and 
autocratic rulers. The latter was a notion that originated in the days of the Persian 
Empire, but took on modern democratic elements in the Constitutional Revolution of 
1906 and again in the Mosaddeq era. These historical experiences prove the existence 
in Iran of a strong civil society that is not easily repressed and controlled by an 
unpopular autocracy. The early days of the 'Islamic' Revolution of 1979 were not 
solely Islamic, more a popular, nationalist revolution, incorporating many disaffected 
Iranians from secular, religious and left wing camps. Salim Mansur describes it as "one 
of the greatest populist explosions in human history." 114 To the US though, the 
Revolution came to be seen as orchestrated and propagated by a religious elite, who 
were set on resisting modernisation and westernisation and returning Iran to its 
backward Islamic past. Mansur refutes this, arguing that: "the militancy of the Islamic 
revolution unfolding in the last quarter of the twentieth century did not represent a 
110 Bill, J.A., The Eagle and the Lion, (Yale University Press, London, 1988),p.259 
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nostalgic reversion to the past, but a rejoining of history disconnected by the colonial 
interlude." 115 
The ensumg ruthless power struggle between the revolutionary factions, won by 
Khomeini and his allies, only proved to the Americans that the revolution was not a 
general nationalist movement but elite based. William 0. Beeman states one of the 
US's five main foreign policy beliefs as "Nations are ruled by a small group of elite 
individuals." He goes on to say: "It is difficult to understand why the United States, 
with its strong internal ethic supporting democracy and broad-based grass-roots 
participation in public affairs, finds it so difficult to take these same broad-based 
processes seriously in other nations." 116 For US analysts therefore, the revolution had 
no democratic legitimacy and as such was viewed as a negative event, which should be 
strongly resisted. President Khatami of Iran has since attempted to change this view. 
He has drawn analogies between Iran's revolutionary project and America's own 
democratic development. 117 As yet he has had little success. The perception of the 
revolution as a religious, fanatical minority versus a respectable, pro western leader 
remams. 
3.2.4 Perceptions of Islam 
Whether the revolution was largely Islamic or nationalist and populist, the US 
perception of it as predominantly Islamic has significantly influenced the US reaction. 
Islam is often viewed as inherently opposed to western ideologies and as such is a direct 
challenge to the US hegemonic attempt. Negative stereotypes of Islamic societies in the 
west, particularly America, are rife. William Quant claims: "for most Americans, it 
seems, Islam is a poorly understood religion with disparate menacing images." 118 A 
poll of Americans done in 1981 found that a large percentage described Arabs as 
"barbaric and cruel", "treacherous and cunning" and "warlike and bloodthirsty". 119 
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These stereotypes are fuelled by three main popular misconceptions. Firstly that Islam 
contradicts democracy and liberal ideals because of its autocratic and patriarchal ethos. 
Secondly that the region's tribal heritage encourages patriarchal and authoritarian 
government and society. Consequently western liberal thinking such as universal rights 
and emancipation of women will never exist in Islamic or Middle Eastern societies. 
Thirdly, ancient historical conflicts between Islam and Christianity have sown the seeds 
ofthe belief that the two civilisations are opposed, incompatible, and more dangerously, 
that Islam is an aggressive religion that encourages violent expansion. The conflict in 
the Middle East between the Arabs and the Israelis, which has been portrayed in the US 
as a contest between aggressive, fanatical Islamists and western orientated democrats 
from the Judo-Christian tradition, has only confirmed this belief. 
The very foundation of the United States is based on notions such as the rights of man, 
including liberty and justice. The Declaration of Independence made to Congress on 41h 
July 1776 states: 
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the consent of the governed."120 
Equal and individual rights, such as the right to vote and freedom of expression, form 
the very essence of politics and culture in the US. The dominant view in the US, often 
described as neo-Orientalism, is that Islam and Islamic societies are the very antithesis 
of these ideals. 121 The academic, Daniel Pipes sums up the neo-Orientalist view by 
claiming that not only do "Muslim countries have the most terrorists and the fewest 
democracies in the world" but that they always will. 122 Neo-Orientalists claim that the 
subservient nature of the religion, both in a Muslim's total submission to god and in 
their women's total submission to their men-folk, go against all notions of free will and 
freedom of expression. Furthermore, Islam was conceived as a complete way of life, 
with laws governing every aspect of daily living. This does not sit well with western 
120 The Declaration of Independence, (4 July 1776), [www.usconstitution.net/declar] 
121 See five polls done in US between 1993 and 1995, quoted in Gerges, F.A., America and Political 
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ideas on secularisation. As Ayubi says, "This fusion of matters of belief with matters of 
conduct in Islam makes it difficult to separate religion from politics." 123 A state based 
on Islam, such as Iran, therefore is a clear representation of the Other; a state that is 
undemocratic, patriarchal and disregards the universality of human rights. The views of 
two American academics, Gedmin and Muravchik support this. They claim: "Iran is the 
font of Islamic fundamentalism, the only still-vibrant ideology challenging the Western-
born philosophy of democracy and the rights of man." 124 
Huntington's "the Clash of Civilisations" is another product of prevalent neo-Orientalist 
trends in America. 125 Although in the past the article has been heavily criticised, the 
recent events of September 11th 2001, have given it new life and credibility, especially 
in America. The premise of his theory is that conflicts between civilisations will 
replace the economic and ideological conflict of the Cold War. He argued that the 
identities of different civilisations are so different and opposing that conflict is 
inevitable. According to Huntington, universal notions of liberalism and human rights 
have only taken root in the western world and are rejected as neo-imperialism by the 
rest of the world. Huntington deals specifically with the Islamic world, using the recent 
emergence of vehement anti-west feeling as evidence of the start of a clash of 
civilisations. Huntington implies that the world is made up of competing Others, but 
particularly the dominant West is pitted against 'the Rest' .126 The Otherness of 
civilisations like Islam make conflict inevitable and common understanding and 
friendship impossible. Huntington would conclude therefore that it is impossible for a 
country like Iran to ever be a true friend to the US. Iran will be inherently opposed to 
the US and its culture. 
The image of Iran is in the main not extracted from the image of the Islamic world in 
general. Iranians are therefore incorporated into Orientalist perceptions of the Middle 
East and the Arabs. These Orientalist perceptions emphasise an historic tribal culture, 
portraying it as a backward, authoritarian and inferior. Ali Zai 'ur maintains that Arabs 
cannot never fit into the modem state system, arguing that Arabs are "always seeking 
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security m solidarity-type relationships rather than in rational-type organisations. 
Lacking in self-esteem, the Arab is on a continuous quest for a hero or a 'charismatic 
leader' to deliver him and rectify all wrongs."127 Baylis and Smith say: "the belief had 
been shaped in the West that Oriental peoples were culturally, historically and socially 
alien. The Orient became associated with references to cruelty, despotism, dishonesty 
and exotic sexual practise." Although Said's study focuses on the time of European 
colonialism, many of the negative stereotypes have remained and continue to be 
reinforced and perpetuated by the western media. 128 The popular film 'Lawrence of 
Arabia' and the Disney production of 'Aladdin' are typical examples. This again 
emphasises the Otherness of people in the Middle East and perpetuates the myth that 
they can never be incorporated into the US' world order. 
The notion that Muslims in the Middle East are aggressively anti the West is the most 
damaging perception ofthe region. Particularly since the end of the Cold War and the 
decline of Communism, political Islam has increasingly been deemed a major threat to 
the western world. Terrorist activities throughout the Middle East, aimed at the US and 
Israel and more recently the attacks in New York and Washington have significantly 
increased this belief. These attacks and terrorist groups are considered irrational, 
religious fanatics and tend in western eyes to be considered as one and the same 
problem; the rise of political Islam. The fact that many are fighting for diverse and 
different causes, such as the liberation of Palestine, the end of the US military presence 
in Saudi Arabia, the downfall of secular, corrupt government etc... is largely 
disregarded in favour of the idea that they are all fighting for Islam and against the 
Christian West. Proponents of this view draw on the history of conflict between Islam 
and Christianity, East and West, to prove that Muslims have always and always will be 
anti the West and expansionist. This idea has sullied the name of political Islam 
detrimentally and with it the image of Iran has suffered. 
After the 1979 Revolution, Iran became inextricably associated with political Islam and 
consequently with all further actions taken under the Islamic banner. Iran's prolific 
sponsorship of various groups and determination to export the revolution throughout the 
1980s supported this assessment. The impact of the Revolution on the American 
psyche is such that all facets of political Islam are deemed Iranian in nature. Despite the 
127 Ayubi, N., Over-stating the Arab State, (I B Tauris, London, 1995), p.397 
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fact that many Islamic movements have different religious and nationalist orientations 
or have little connection with Tehran, in the eyes of many Americans the problem is an 
Iranian phenomenon. Gedmin and Muravchik suggest this when they say: "Whether or 
not they share Teheran's Shi'ite orientation, the various Islamist movements take 
inspiration (and in many cases material assistance) from the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Common to them is an explicitly anti-Western outlook, nourished by the conviction that 
the relative weakness and backwardness of the Islamic world are the results of a 
conspiracy which has Zionists or Jews at its controls and America- the 'great Satan' -
at its center." 129 It is true that the Iranian Revolution was the world's first significant 
taste of this anti-American, Islamic ideology and it is also the case that it has flourished 
since. However it is not clear that establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran was a 
direct cause of this phenomenon. It is more probable that an Islamic Iran was, rather 
than a cause, a symptom of an already existing phenomenon. The Iranian Revolution 
was a catalyst for other Islamic movements but not the root of the problem. 
The negative stereotyping of Islam provides a specific problem for the US in that it has 
many close allies in the region whose rulers and people are Muslims. A distinction has 
therefore been made between 'good Muslims' and 'bad Muslims.' The former being 
those Muslims and Islamic countries willing to co-operate and participate in the world 
order and the latter being those opposed to America's hegemony. For example during 
the Persian Gulf War ofthe early 90s, the Kuwaiti were viewed as 'good Muslims' who 
needed rescuing from the 'bad Muslim', Saddam Hussein. The Palestinians and 
countries such as Iraq, Syria and the Sudan who counter American interests in the 
region are seen very differently to those Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia who aid 
them. Likewise groups who oppose Middle Eastern governments allied to the US, such 
as Al-Qaeda and Hizbollah are 'bad Muslims' who must be contained. Iran, in the eyes 
ofthe US is the very archetype of a 'bad' Muslim state. 
3.2.5 Iran's Revolutionary Ideology 
Following the initial populist uprising, the US became increasingly concerned with 
developments in Iran. Two groups emerged, described here as revolutionary ideologues 
129 Muravchik, J. & Gedmin, J., 'Why Iran is Still a Menace', Commentary, (July 1997), p.40 
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and revolutionary pragmatists. As the former became more and more influential, 
negative perceptions of the Iranian Revolution as confrontational increased. 
Significantly for current views on Iran it is these latter perceptions that are emphasised 
and remembered. 
Divisions within the Islamic Republic of Iran over policy, particularly foreign policy, 
were apparent from the start. One faction, initially led by the provisional Prime 
Minister, Mehdi Bazargan believed in the pursuit of 'equilibrium' through a policy of 
non-alignment. By refusing to support both America and the Soviet Union, Iran could 
aim to develop a relationship based on independence and equality, not dominance and 
imperialism. Towards America and the USSR, Iran would be non-hostile and neutral. 
Bazargan followed policies such as cancelling the Iranian-US defence agreement of 
1959 and disbanding two secret US listening posts on the Soviet border. 130 This 
pragmatic faction countenanced working within the international system, continuing 
relations, whilst at all times maintaining the independence of Iran. The primary concern 
was Iran's national interests, with Islamic ideology coming second. 
This approach to foreign policy did not constitute a hegemonic challenge to the US or 
the Soviet Union, but the pragmatist's influence waned with the onset of the US hostage 
crisis in November 1979. Revolutionary ideologues or idealists saw the policy of 
neutral equilibrium as pro-America and therefore, partially incited by a meeting 
between Bazargan and the US National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, seized 
the US embassy and an era of confrontational foreign policy ensued. This event showed 
Khomeini and much of the Iranian leadership that public support for antagonistic 
foreign policies was considerable and therefore the seizure of the embassy must be 
supported no matter what harm was done to external relations. Khomeini' s primary 
concern was his own Islamic and anti-imperialist legitimacy, which was gained from his 
adherence to the ideology of the revolution, not Iran's relationship with the outside 
world. 
Khomeini himself had an element of both factions in his policy; he was often pragmatic. 
However the ideologues took many of their ideas and justification from Khomeini' s 
ideas of what an Islamic Iran should be and do. Consequently Khomeini's ideas on 
130 Ramazani, R.K., 'Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations', p.205 
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international relations, although heavily contested and ambiguous, are helpful m 
explaining why America saw Iran as such a hegemonic threat. 
Khomeini saw the Cold War international system as comprising of two opposmg 
suzerain-state systems, the US and the USSR. A suzerain-state system is" a system in 
which one state asserts and maintains domination and supremacy over the rest. It is not 
imperial because the member states have a certain independence, nor is it a hegemonial 
relation because the preponderant state has more than power over the suzerain-states; it 
exercises authority as well." 131 Khomeini argued that the two super-powers controlled 
the world through force and domination in the pursuit of their own interests: 
"The threat to the world today stems from the two superpowers. They have 
manipulated the whole world under their own control and use it for their own interests 
. . . Reason and experience alike tell us that the governments now existing in the world 
were established by bayonet-point, by force. None of the monarchies or governments 
that we see in the world are based on justice or [on] a correct foundation that is 
acceptable to reason. Their foundations are all rotten, being nothing but coercion and 
force." 132 
Here, Khomeini completely dismisses the ideological premise of the US and Soviet 
world order, arguing that the only way is the path of Islam: 
"There are only three paths: one is the 'straight path;' [I:6] the others are the path of the 
East, 'those who earn thine anger' [I:7] and the path of the West, 'those who go astray' 
[I:7] ... the straight path is the path of Islam, which is the true path of humanity; it leads 
man to perfection, and belongs to God."133 
This is a clear challenge to both the US and Soviet hegemonic attempts. By denying 
that their systems have any ideological base or consensus, Khomeini undermines their 
respective hegemonies. He is exposing them as exploiters and manipulators, not as 
leaders of an ideology that works to the benefit of the universal interest. He claims that 
Islam is the only true ideology, having been given to man by God. Support for 
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Khomeni's ideas clearly directly threatened American and Soviet supremacy, which 
was based on ideology as well as economic and military dominance. 
The Americans were horrified at the new developments in Iran for a number of reasons. 
Firstly it was a unique challenge. Other states, such as Yugoslavia, Egypt and India, 
professed non-alignment but still had some dealings with either side. There was no 
previous example of total rejection and opposition to the bipolar system. Although in 
practical terms, Khomeini operated within the international system of nation states, 
within his ideology, Khomeini rejected the idea of nation states, arguing that they were 
foreign imposed. "The central aim of the colonialist powers, Khomeini maintains, is to 
destroy the Qu'ran, Islam and the ulama [because] these are the only obstacles in the 
way of taking over the resources of the Islamic countries. To that end, the powers 
partitioned the homeland of Islam into small countries in the aftermath of World War 
!."134 He saw the international system not in terms of nation states but in terms of 
ideology and therefore argued for Islamic unity. He wanted himself and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran to lead a unified Islamic 'nation' in the model of the Islamic Republic 
to serve the interests of Islam. 
The second problem for the US was that the very emphasis on ideology was much more 
difficult to oppose than economic, military or political competition. Khomeini 
intentionally emphasised the need to propagate the Islamic path by example, not by 
force, because economically, militarily and politically, Iran was the inferior. Iran could 
not dominate the world, only persuade others that its ideology was the only way and in 
the universal interest. 
Thirdly, just as the US had failed to truly incorporate Iran into its hegemony before the 
Revolution, there were other states in the Middle East, where America had co-opted the 
elite but where American ideology had not superseded Islamic or national loyalties. 
Only 'passive revolution' had occurred. Therefore there was a considerable base for 
Iranian revolutionaries to successfully disseminate Khomeini's ideology. Lebanon, Iraq 
and other Gulf countries were potentially particularly open to Iranian revolutionary 
ideas because of the existence of considerable Shi'ite minorities, opposition to 
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America's support for Israel and the growmg rejection of America's military and 
economic dominance in the region. 
Finally Khomeini 's statements of intentions and policies implied to the US that Iran was 
going to make every effort to export its revolutionary ideology to unite Muslims in 
opposition to superpower dominance. 
"We will export our Revolution throughout the world because it is an Islamic 
revolution. The struggle will continue until the calls 'there is no god but God' and 
'Muhammad is the messenger of God' are echoed all over the world. The struggle will 
continue as long as the oppressors subjugate people in every corner of the world." 135 
There were many examples during the 1980s of practical steps that Iran took to spread 
the message of the revolution and encourage other Muslims to rise up against 
oppressive regimes dominated by the superpowers. Khomeini believed that the 
revolution could be spread by 'awakening nations' through propaganda and preaching. 
To this end Iran began supporting Lebanese Hizbollah and Islamic Amal fighting the 
Israeli occupation in South Lebanon, allegedly aided an attempted coup in Bahrain in 
1981 and sponsored annual demonstrations during the Hajj in Saudi Arabia. 136 Despite 
Khomeini's teachings, many revolutionary ideologues went further, arguing for the 
export of the revolution "by any means, including the use of force." 137 Hence 
Revolutionary Guards were sent to train and fight in Lebanon and Iran was allegedly 
involved in the bombing of US and French forces in Lebanon in 1983 and the taking of 
western hostages throughout the 1980s. These events directly challenged US interests 
and prestige in the region and etched damaging images of Iran deeper onto the 
American psyche. Two hundred and forty one US marines were killed in the 1983 
Beirut bombing and numerous US citizens were amongst those kidnapped in the 80s. 
The practical and physical threats backed up the ideological challenge emanating from 
Iran, gave credence to the American belief that Iran was a considerable threat to its 
hegemonic attempt, especially in the Islamic world. The total rejection by Iranian 
ideologues of the international system and its ideologies meant that co-opting Iran by 
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economic and political influence was impossible. They seemed intent on creating a 
rival hegemony based around Khomeini's interpretation of Islam and international 
politics. 
Contact was maintained by America with the pragmatists in Iran's foreign policy, but 
was often undermined. For example, Rafsanjani attempted to gain essential military 
supplies from America to fight Iraq by offering to help the Americans get the release of 
western hostages in Lebanon. This was part of a larger policy by Rafsanjani "to restore 
Iran's links with the West, links considered crucial for the survival of the Islamic 
Republic." 138 In practise Iran did not exert sufficient pressure on Shi'ite militias in 
Lebanon and only two hostages were released. 139 Rafsanjani's pragmatic policy failed 
completely when Iranian ideologues exposed the story, successfully sabotaging 
negotiations. 
When negotiations were publicised, the Administration was acutely embarrassed at the 
exposure of their hypocrisy and American Gulf allies such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
were furious. The 'Affair' put an end to secret communications and left America wary 
of approaching Iran again. The situation proved to the US that Iran was incapable of 
acting within the realms of realism and was therefore an unreliable and unpredictable 
negotiating partner. It was clear to the US that whilst ideologues dominated Iran's 
foreign policy during the 1980s, the ideological challenge to America was considerable. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran represented an ideology that not only offered an 
alternative to the US and Soviet models but provided another universal ideology, with a 
potentially significant support base that would be in direct competition with previous 
ideological norms. Here was an alternative, distinctive worldview, another hegemonic 
attempt. True hegemony is not achievable but each attempt is aiming towards absolute 
parameters. The ideologies emerging from Iran had the potential to start a new historic 
bloc, supplanting US domination. America therefore had every reason to have 
considerable concerns about the ideological challenge from Iran. 
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3.3 The Lasting Effect and the US Response 
Preconceptions of Islam, the communication breakdown and the openness oflran's anti-
American behaviour sparked an immediate distrust and dislike of the goings on in Iran 
that pertain today. The revolution was seen in the US as a personal affront on many 
levels. Firstly their number one ally in the region was ignominiously removed. 
Secondly the revolutionaries specifically targeted the US's alliance with the Shah as a 
major cause of Iran's problems. Vehement accusations of American imperialism were 
made and American interests in Iran were attacked. The lack of understanding of the 
domestic climate in Iran prior to the revolution meant that the US could not comprehend 
any rational reasons behind the hostility and merely saw it as irrational and typical of an 
Islamic movement; in other words, anti the liberal, democratic world order. The 
Revolution was seen in terms of crazy, irrational mullahs pitted against rational, western 
style government. Previous stereotypes of Islam and the Islamic movement were 
reinforced and emphasised. 
All of the above - the image of Muslims and Islam, the anti American nature of the 
revolution and the hostage crisis, the lack of good intelligence and the revolutionary 
behaviour of Iran in the early years - all contributed to the view that the Islamic 
Republic of Iran was fundamentally ideologically opposed to the US and always would 
be. The strength of this belief has coloured and prevented opportunities for the re-
establishment of relations. Whatever Iran does and however Iran behaves, these 
pertaining images mean it will always be viewed as an outsider, as an opponent of 
America's hegemony. A participant in a US Institute of Peace discussion on Iran is 
quoted as saying: "US policy as stated seems as if it is fundamentally hostile to Iran -
not just the mullahs- and that anything they do will not be enough."140 
To maintain the position that the US hegemony enjoys as a widely accepted norm, any 
opposing position is consciously and subconsciously dismissed as invalid and illogical. 
The propagation, throughout the hegemony, of the belief in the irrationality of a state 
like Iran explains the US policy of isolation and demonisation of Iran. Bowen's article 
on 'rogue' states says: "there is a tendency to view these regimes as unpredictable, 
139 Hooglund, E., 'The United States and Iran, 1981-9', in Ehteshami, A. & Varasteh, M. (eds), Iran and 
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reckless, bellicose, incapable of moderation under most circumstance, out of touch with 
reality and consequently very difficult to conduct normal relations with." 141 The US 
isolates Iran, arguing that there is no point negotiating to get changes in WMD, 
terrorism or Middle East peace process policies because Iran will not behave as a typical 
player on the international scene. Iran is dismissed as an anomaly that will remain 
outside the realities of the rational world. The State Department tags of 'rogue' or 
'outlaw' state pertained well into the 1990s. Anthony Lake (National Security Advisor), 
referring in part to Iran, stated in 1994 that: "[America must] face the reality of 
recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only chose to remain outside the family but 
assault its basic values . . . [These states] exhibit a chronic inability to engage 
constructively with the outside world." 142 The hegemonic contest has prevented the US 
from allowing Iran to be seen as a rational, typical player in the world of states, capable 
of operating responsibly within the world system. 
The idea within the US of a hegemonic contest has continued despite very real changes 
in Iran. Following the Iran Iraq War, various factors combined to cause a significant 
shift in Iran's foreign policy away from revolutionary ideology and towards 
pragmatism. Iran therefore ceased to constitute such a significant hegemonic threat and 
yet, America continued to perceive them as one. American policy did not alter and, if 
anything, became more hard line. The image of Iran as an ideological antagonist proved 
impossible to change. 
After the Iran-Iraq War, economic and military recovery became essential for the 
survival of the Islamic Republic. This forced Iran into more acceptable foreign policies 
so that it could open itself up for trade. To do this they had to operate within the 
international system and even positively promote relations with former adversaries. 
Security and stability in the region was seen as paramount to economic prosperity. 
Therefore regional, as well as international co-operation was promoted. Economic 
contacts and communications were established with European countries and others such 
as Japan, South Korea, Brazil, India, Taiwan, Turkey, as well as the GCC states, 
including Saudi Arabia. 143 Efforts to export the revolution were drastically curtailed, 
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partly because there were adverse affects on Iran's national interests, but also because 
other Islamic societies were not very receptive to Khomeini' s interpretation of Islam 
and the political system. National loyalties and loyalties to other sects of Islam proved 
too strong to be broken even by a charismatic leader such as Khomeini. The death of 
Khomeini further weakened the ideological strength of Iran. 
President Rafsanjani, elected in 1989 was the champion of this new pragmatic 
perspective. It was under him that Iran sought to boost its international standing and 
acceptance by remaining neutral in the Gulf War of 1990-91. Ideologically Iran was 
opposed to any interference by outside powers in the region, arguing that "foreigners do 
not come here for the sake of our people or our interests . . . if there are any points of 
contention among us, we should resolve them ourselves."144 However, in the case of 
the Gulf crisis, Iran prioritised the strategic interest of a stable region above ideology. 
This position went some way to convincing the world that Iran was keen to co-operate 
within the international system. It did much to improve already improving relations 
with other Gulf States, thereby improving economic prospects. The isolation of Iraq 
that followed was also welcomed by Iran. Ehteshami interestingly points out that: "in 
1990 ... Iran stood on the side of the west and for Kuwaiti sovereignty and the right of 
its Emir to rule the sheikdom, when just a few years earlier it had not only tried to 
secure the demise of the ruling Al-Sabah family through support for Islamic dissident 
forces in Kuwait, but had played a significant part in escalating regional tensions." 145 
Policy in Lebanon, the prevtous hotbed of Iranian revolutionary ideology also 
significantly moderated. Rafsanjani personally marginalized the influence of the more 
extreme clerical factions, most notably the former Iranian Ambassador to Syria, 
Hoijatoleslam Mohtashemi. He set about forging links with more moderate Shi'ite 
groups in Lebanon and helped facilitate the return of western hostages. 
Given the economic and political benefit a receptive Iran could bring to the region and 
the world in terms of oil and gas and geographical, demographic and military standing, 
Iran assumed that foreign policy changes would be the prerequisite to economic and 
political recognition and inclusion. This was not the case. Misunderstandings, 
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accusations and policy sabotage by opponents to Iran's reconciliation continued to 
undermine Iran's progress. Ansari says: "Investment did not materialise and it was 
increasingly apparent that the slightest 'misdemeanour' on Iran's part, be it with respect 
to human rights or through alleged terrorist activities, inevitably and almost 
automatically led to a diplomatic setback." 146 
Iran assumed that the US would follow its professed realist line and respond positively 
to the changes. Iranian policy makers were genuinely bewildered at the American 
response who, far from accepting Iran onto the international scene, pursued an 
increasingly isolationist policy towards Iran during the early 1990s. As the Iran Contra 
Affair showed, previous US Administrations were not adverse to attempting to deal 
with Iran on a practical level. Relations between the two states were still fluid. This 
changed with the first Clinton Administration, which consolidated and solidified the 
present isolationist, anti Iran position. The American government under Clinton 
claimed to remain concerned about Iran's regional ambitions. They professed concern 
about Iran's continued sponsorship of Islamic terrorist groups, alleged development of 
weapons of mass destruction and disruption of the Arab-Israeli peace process. 
Consequently, in 1993, the US initiated the policy of dual containment. 
The idea of Clinton's dual containment was to isolate both Iran and Iraq to keep them 
weak. This isolation took the form of an arms ban, a ban on dual-use technologies, a 
total import ban on Iranian products, controls on exports to Iran and a diplomatic stance 
to block all lending to Iran from international financial institutions. As part of the 
policy, the U.S. also undertook to pressure and persuade other countries to follow their 
lead. "Washington will work 'energetically' to persuade other countries not to engage 
in military transactions or 'normal commercial relations' with Tehran."147 
A review of the policy was carried out in 1995, which concluded that Iran's behaviour 
had worsened. In a meeting with the Senate, Ellen Laipson, a representative of the 
national security council reported: "We believe that the rise in terrorism against the 
Middle East peace process that began in the fall of 1994 has some links to Iran ... We 
also saw continuing and, in some ways, accelerating signs of Iran's efforts to procure 
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the materials and technology needed for a weapons-of-mass-destruction program."148 
As a consequence of these perceptions, the policy was reinforced. Trade, loans and 
financial services to Iran were all prohibited. In 1996 the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 
was passed. This act threatened to sanction anyone, including foreign companies if they 
invested more than $40 million (now lowered to $20 million) in Iran. 
According to Ansari this policy of increasing isolation, "was not in essence a matter of 
'interest' but a matter of 'communication'."149 America still perceived Iran as a 
dangerous adversary, both ideologically and strategically. Past animosity meant that the 
Americans viewed Iran's reconciliation policies, not positively, but as an attempt to 
resume its position as a regional power, in direct competition with America. The US 
was suspicious of Iranian economic and military recovery and feared that Iran would 
take over America's role as the regional 'policeman', but not, as in the shah's time, 
under US control. Rafsanjani strongly denied this accusation: 
"Under no circumstances are we prepared to have the clock turned back in the Persian 
Gulf- and we ourselves will never be willing- even as an independent sovereign state 
to serve as the guardian of others, since this goes against the very grain and nature of 
our revolution. " 150 
However, from the American perspective, there were very good reasons why an 
influential Iran would be a threat to its interests in the region. Again the threat was 
mainly ideological rather than physical. When the Arab-Israeli peace process got off 
the ground at the Madrid Conference of October 1991, Iran was left increasingly 
isolated in its position towards Israel. The peace process provided "tangible evidence 
that the Islamic agenda had little or no relevance to the policies of most Arab states." 151 
This left the way open for Iran to monopolise the Islamic and anti-Israel agenda in the 
Arab world, where previously the fact that Iran was not Arab and Shi'ite had meant 
Tehran had little influence. Iran was able to unite many disparate groups from all over 
the Arab world, both secular and Islamic, in an anti-Madrid coalition and thus become 
the focal point of the pro-Palestinian lobby. This earned them considerable influence. 
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For example, Iran organised a rival conference to Madrid entitled the International 
Conference on the Support of the Palestinian Islamic Revolution, which attracted 
representatives from forty-nine countries. 152 On a practical level, Iran did little but 
provide some financial backing, but on an ideological level, Iran provided a forum for 
opponents of the peace process to air anti Israeli and American views. 
This leadership of the anti-Israeli agenda directly challenged US interests in the region 
and provided a substantial reason for the Americans to be suspicious of Iranian 
intentions. The collapse of the USSR and the emergence of the Central Asian States, 
with their majority Islamic population was a further source of concern for the US. Iran 
not only had new economic markets to develop, but also a new audience potentially 
receptive to the idea of further Islamic states in the Iranian model. In fact economic 
priorities meant that interfering with states in Central Asia was not high on Iran's 
agenda. However, Saudi Arabia was pumping money and its own Islamic teachings 
into the area, which reawakened the long-standing rivalry with Iran for influence. 
Although Rafsanjani professed that Iran was not a physical threat to other states in the 
region, that its interests were to promote stability and co-operation, Iran's stance against 
America's presence in the Gulf had the potential to totally undermine the US's attempts 
at supremacy in the region. Despite wanting to reintegrate into the world economic 
system, Iran was still not willing to join America's world order. Domestic public 
opinion would have made any significant loss of independence, be it ideological, 
political or economic, completely unacceptable to Iran. It would have been against the 
very ethos of the Revolution. Rafsanjani continued to encourage other states in the 
region to follow Iran's independent stance: "we are opposed to the existing policy 
which entails seeking protection from foreigners and guaranteeing security through a 
foreign naval presence ... There is no reason for their presence in the south. It serves no 
purpose for them to remain. The only reason is to provoke us so we will fight one 
another. Hence, if there are any points of contention among us, we should resolve them 
ourselves." 153 
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Despite US concerns and despite the difficulty in proving what Iranian intentions were 
in pursuing conciliatory policies, it is certainly the case that economic recovery and 
military reconstruction were the priorities for the Rafsanjani administration. America 
could have harnessed this desire for integration and encouraged further moderation, 
including potentially the exploitation of Iranian markets by US companies. However, 
suspicions based largely on ideological assumptions prevented them from doing this. 
For Iranian policymakers, as Ansari says: "the realisation that they had lost the initiative 
during the first decade of the revolution and that the international environment was in 
effect ideologically reconstructed against them was a bitter pill to swallow."154 Iran has 
come to realise under Khatami that not only are 'real' policy changes needed but that 
US suspicions must be removed to change Iran's status as a rogue state. Iran needs to 
persuade America and the world that it is not an ideological challenge to the present 
world order. 
The irony of the American Iranian relationship is that as Iran has further pursued an 
integrative approach, recognising the limitations of their revolutionary ideology, 
America has pursued an increasingly severe policy. America continues to perceive Iran 
as "an independent revisionist actor; a challenger to the prestige hierarchy, a potential 
economic and military power, a potentially alternative value structure and civilisational 
order, and an inspiration to those disenchanted with the existing global system."155 It 
may be that America has externalised its own faults. Very heavily based itself on an 
ideological foundation, America may be assuming that Iran is similarly ideological. 
Theirry Hentsch in his study of Orientalism believes this to be a common phenomenon 
in western perceptions of the Muslim world. "He believes that Western images of the 
Muslim world are projections of Western insecurities about Self onto the Other, and that 
as long as the other is the mirror for the Self, there will always be conflict." 156 
Whether justified or not, this view of Iran as an opponent of the US system remains 
widely accepted in America. The US therefore remains wary and largely unwilling to 
accept and deal with an Islamic Iran. The majority of US policymakers continue to see 
Iran in absolute terms, refusing to accept the potential validity of any conciliatory 
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moves by Tehran. No matter how numerous and how significant changes to Iran's 
foreign policy are, it will only be when these perceptions of Iran are deconstructed from 
within the US that relations can ever improve. 
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4. THE W ASIDNGTON POLICY MONOPOLY 
There have been numerous opportunities for change. The 'realist' justifications for 
policy have been shown to be exaggerated, based on highly subjective evidence and not 
universally applied to all states. There remains no significant practical obstruction to 
America forming some kind of relationship with Iran. In fact, the opposite is true; 
there are numerous impetuses for both sides to begin dialogue. For example, just as in 
Afghanistan, a co-operative Iran would be very useful to Washington in the event of any 
action taken against Iraq. Also, the economic benefits to both countries of lifting trade 
restrictions and approving a Caspian oil pipeline through Iran are well documented and 
valid. Despite all of this, the new Bush Administration has not altered policy towards 
Iran. 
Furthermore America remains alone in the world in believing that isolation and blanket 
condemnation will succeed in bringing about positive changes in Iran's foreign policy. 
The European Union for one has chosen a path of 'Critical Dialogue', encouraging the 
positive changes in Iran and using its influence to condemn unacceptable behaviour. 
The Europeans criticise American policy, arguing that the constant antagonism 
undermines the reformist movement in Iran and makes it more difficult for politicians 
like Khatami to advocate the changes demanded by the Americans. 157 Washington 
continues to provide ammunition for the more ideological elements in Iran who are then 
able to blame domestic economic and political problems on American hostility. As for 
nuclear proliferation, which at present America seems to view as the most worrying 
concern, a strong case can be made that isolation actually provides motivation to pursue 
the nuclear option. As Fawaz A Gerges says: "Treating Iran as an 'international outlaw' 
and 'rogue' state will reinforce its ruling elite's collective sense of paranoia. To prevent 
Iran from going nuclear, Washington should aim to assimilate the Islamic Republic into 
the international community, rather than treating it as an outcast." 158 
Washington's policy does not reflect changes in Iran nor acknowledge these world-wide 
criticisms because policy making towards Iran is heavily steeped in ideology, rather 
than practical considerations. The climate is such that a rational and pragmatic analysis 
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of the situation by Washington is impossible. As has been discussed, policymaking can 
never be made in a vacuum, devoid of ideology. Policy makers are all individuals and 
are therefore subject to ideological influences such as preconceptions, stereotypes and 
historical experience. The ideological aspect in the relationship with Iran, however, has 
hijacked policy to an unprecedented and unique extent. Amongst the foreign policy 
elite and the American public, there is such a strong preoccupation with Iran as a 
menacing, pariah state that the many contradictory voices in Washington and the world 
go completely unheard. 
This uniformity in policy can be explained by applying Gramsci's ideas on hegemony in 
a second context; with respect to the American policy making process towards Iran. 
The US foreign policy making process is a complex system of competing groups, 
interests and ideas. Every group has its own agenda and is vying for supremacy over 
policy. Again a group has two tools: coercion and consensus. Through the provision of 
considerable election funds a group can coerce various politicians to vote a certain way. 
However on its own, this is a very crude method and open to public and media 
criticism. Particularly within a democratic society, the use of ideas and persuasion to 
create a consensus is a much more effective tool. The more successful a group is at 
disseminating its own ideas within the system, the more policy reflects their own 
agenda. 
In the case of Iran, whilst there are minor differences in approach between the State 
Department and the Administration and the Congress and the Defence Department (the 
latter two pushing for a tougher line on Iran), the policy consensus remains isolation, 
condemnation and economic punishment. It is predominantly the Israeli Lobby and to a 
lesser extent the Defence Department in the US that has sought and largely succeeded in 
portraying their own agenda. In a Gramscian 'war of position' the Israeli Lobby has 
helped form and maintained an hegemony over US policy towards Iran by the 
disseminating their ideas in the media, intelligence networks, and the Congressional 
system. They have drawn on and manipulated preconceptions of Iran leading to a 
disproportionate level of influence on policy. The success of the Israeli Lobby is 
largely down to its ideological and organisational strength in America but also 
opposition to its ideas on Iran is insubstantial and constantly undermined. The 
following is an in depth analysis of the America's foreign policy making system, 
examining how and why the policy monopoly has been achieved and maintained. 
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4.1 The Mechanics of the American Foreign Policy Making System 
The foreign policy making process in the United States, like all facets of American 
government, is a system of competing factions with conflicting interests and priorities. 
This system was laid out in the constitution and based firmly on the checks and balances 
idea. The sharing of foreign policy powers between Congress and the Administration 
meant each were accountable to the other. Numerous access points to the system were 
designed to allow a variety of differing groups to influence policy, intended to create a 
broad representation of society's views. This was the ideal of the constitution but in 
practise the situation has been very different. Opinions on the realities of foreign 
policymaking and policymaking in general are contentious and have changed over time. 
For example many describe presidential power versus Congressional power as such: 
"the president proposes, Congress disposes." 159 In other words the president proposes 
policy and Congress will criticise it and amend it where necessary. However over time 
Congress has become more proactive. After the debacle of the Vietnam War for 
example, Congress became more assertive, heavily curtailing the president's powers and 
demanding more information and say in projected operations abroad. In the case of 
Iran, the ILSA and the extension of ILSA originated in Congress and was pushed 
through despite reservations from both the Clinton and Bush administrations. 
Broadly speaking the foreign policymaking process consists of the following 
institutions: the president and his advisors (especially the National Security Council), 
the State Department, the Defence Department, and Congress (particularly the House 
and Senate foreign affairs committees). These are influenced to varying degrees by the 
following: the views and lobbying abilities of official interest groups, public opinion, 
the media and the stances of foreign governments and international institutions. 
Traditionally all the above institutions have different characteristics, attitudes and 
therefore differing perspectives on policy choices. For example the Defence 
Department's priority is to protect its extensive budget in order to maintain weapons 
programmes and prevent job cutbacks. They are therefore likely to take a more 
antagonistic approach to potential threats, exaggerating them to justify enormous 
defence spending. The State Department in contrast, traditionally takes a more 
accommodating approach to potential problems abroad, often arguing for dialogue and 
159 Kegley, C.W. & Wittkopf, E.R., American Foreign Policy, (fifth edition, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 
1996), p.421 
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negotiation over the use of force or sanctions. The State Department has better contacts 
with foreign governments and consequently is more aware of the affects of American 
actions on international relationships. The President is more attune to public opinion as 
expressed in the media, which is ultimately where his legitimacy lies. Congress on the 
other hand is the bastion of interest groups. Congress' access to public opinion on 
foreign affairs relies heavily on official interest groups. 
The powers of these different institutions and the strength of these influences are not 
clear cut and often strongly contested. The primary debate on foreign policymaking 
however focuses on who makes policy and does it reflect the views of the American 
people. In a liberal democratic system, the ideal must be that public opinion is 
represented by politicians and then reflected in policy choices. The accusation often 
levelled at the American foreign policy system is that it is elite led and is not 
sufficiently accountable to the American public. This accusation is backed up by two 
factors: firstly that the personnel within the process all come from a similar educational 
and class background and secondly that the American public are largely uninterested 
and ill informed about foreign affairs and therefore do not criticise or scrutinise elite 
decisions. According to Kegley and Wittkopf, "top positions have been filled by people 
from the upper class who were educated at the nations best schools ... they have 
generally come from predominantly white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant (WASP) 
backgrounds; a disproportionate number have been trained in law; and many have had 
extensive experience in big business." 160 They describe American society as a pyramid 
with very few at the apex knowledgeable, able and willing to become involved in the 
process. The tier below are interested in foreign affairs but have no access to 
government. The majority however, which Kegley and Wittkopf put at about 90%, are 
in the main indifferent. 161 Hague, Harrop and Breslin discuss other studies of 
democracies that "confirm the ignorance of large sections of the public, especially on 
foreign policy issues remote from ordinary life."162 This of course alters when a major 
crisis occurs, such as the Iranian hostage crisis, the Gulf War of the early 90s or 
September 11th, all of which captured the public's imagination. The concern in these 
situations however, is that, because the public are generally ill informed, they will 
16° Kegley, C.W. & Wittkopf, E.R., American Foreign Policy, p.267 
161 Kegley, C.W. & Wittkopf, E.R., American Foreign Policy, p.283 
162 Hague, R., Harrop, M. & Breslin, S., Comparative Government and Politics, (fourth edition, 
MacMillan Press, London, 1998), P.llO 
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merely accept wholeheartedly a government position, supported by media reports and 
fail to scrutinise policy adequately. 
The role of media becomes key here because it is the main source of public information. 
Any knowledge the general public does accrue on foreign affairs originates largely from 
the media, especially television. Evidence also suggests that policy makers themselves 
rely heavily on media information, especially from newspapers such as the New York 
Times. In a study of one hundred officials in policy positions, quoted in Kegley and 
Wittkopf, nearly two-thirds stated that the media were generally "their most rapid 
source of information in crisis situations" and over four-fifths indicated the media were 
"an important source of policy-relevant information."163 This position as primary 
disseminator of information on foreign affairs gives the media tremendous influence on 
what is discussed and how it is discussed. In Iran's case an interesting example was the 
coverage of the shooting down of the Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes. This story 
was pushed to the back pages by coverage of a slump in Wall Street and consequently 
many in the American public were not and are still not aware of the enormity and 
significance of the event on US Iranian relations. The dramatic events of the Iranian 
hostage crisis on the other hand dominated the media for weeks. Consequently it is the 
latter, not the former, event that is associated, in the minds of Americans, with Iran. 
Likewise, within minutes of the Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995, the media was 
comparing the attack to the World Trade Centre bombing of 1993 and the truck 
bombings in Lebanon in the 1980s. Slogans such as "terror in the heartland" or 
"Muslim terrorists wreaking havoc in the land they loathe"164 appeared. The 
assumption that this was perpetrated by Islamic militants was instantaneous and 
immediately taken up by politicians desperate to make political capital on issues such as 
immigration. When it became clear that the bomber was a home-grown white 
supremacist, the media reacted as if this was a new and isolated phenomenon and 
slogans changed from "terror in the heartland" to "tragedy in Oklahoma." 165 This 
illuminates just how the media can dictate how an event is reported and shows the 
effects of their interpretation on a receptive political and public scene. 
163 Kegley, C.W. & Wittkopf, E.R., American Foreign Policy, p.325 
164 Progler, J.A., 'The Utility of Islamic Imagery in the West: An American Case Study', (Winter 1997), 
[www.ireland.iol.ie/~afifi/Articles/image] 
77 
Concerns are also often raised about the power of special interest groups within the 
realms of foreign policy. Some argue that the lack of public interest and knowledge on 
foreign affairs allows interest groups, particularly single-issue interest groups, to 
dominate policy. Organised, focused groups become the primary and sometimes sole 
main influence on policymakers, unchallenged by society in the main. This leaves the 
process open to manipulation by powerful groups such as the military-industrial 
complex, big business and ethnic groups. Others argue, however that interest groups 
are a positive feature of American politics, helping the public to get involved in policy 
making and providing access to top officials and politicians. This pluralist model 
however is limited in the foreign policy context because of the even lower level of 
public interest and participation; it is undoubtedly comparatively easy for specific 
interest groups to monopolise the policy agenda. 
The above describes very briefly the kinds of factors and influences involved in the 
foreign policy making system. In the case of Iran, it is uniquely unnecessary to 
investigate meticulously the extent to which these factors and institutions have a say in 
policy because largely there is a policy consensus. Views on Iran- its image, behaviour 
and intentions- vary little within Washington, the media and amongst the wider public. 
Even across party lines, there is broad bipartisan support for a tough policy on Iran. 
This lack of debate, despite real and recognised changes in Iran's behaviour over time, 
is curious and deserves close attention. 
The two government departments closely involved in policy making towards Iran are 
the State Department and the Defence Department. The former is primarily concerned 
with terrorism, assessing and encouraging Iran's internal reform and managing Iran's 
regional ambitions and new alliances. The latter is principally concerned with Iran's 
weapons proliferation, particularly nuclear, and also regional stability. Although during 
the Clinton Administration there was much input from the President on Iranian policy, 
the Bush Administration has taken little initiative, leaving Iranian policy for the time 
being subject to review. 
This leaves Congress as the other main actor in the system. This is where most of the 
open discussion on Iran takes place. Whilst the current president has remained 
165 Progler, J.A., 'The Utility oflslamic Imagery in the West: An American Case Study', (Winter 1997), 
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relatively inactive on a practical level on the Iranian question, initiatives from Congress, 
such as the renewal of ILSA and money for CIA operations to overthrow the Iranian 
regime, have continued. 166 It is also where opinion on Iran is most emotive and hard 
line. The following are statements from a number of members of Congress, designed to 
represent the strength of feeling and views of the majority: 
"Both factions in Iran are absolutely united in their support for terrorism, in their total 
opposition to the peace process an in their belief that Iran should go full speed ahead in 
developing nuclear weapons and developing the infrastructure to deliver those 
weapons." 167 
(Congressman Brad Sherman, 26 July 2001) 
"Iran has done absolutely nothing to merit the lifting of sanctions and in some key 
ways, its international behaviour has gotten worse ... Appeasement won't change 
that."I68 
(Congressman Gary Ackerman, 23 May 2001) 
"Iran continues to support Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other 
radical groups dedicated to the destruction of Israel . . . And the Iranian regime has 
accelerated its aggressive pursuit of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and 
ballistic missiles. " 169 
(Congressman Howard L. Berman, 23 May 2001) 
"The United States must stand up and speak out for our democratic and Jefferson values 
and the dignity of all human beings. We must send Iran and Libya a strong message 
that such behaviour will not be tolerated."170 
(Congressman Eric Cantor, 21 June 2001) 
166 Congressional Speaker, Newt Gingrich pushed for $20 million for CIA operations against the Iranian 
regime, despite the fact that the CIA said operations were likely to fail, it was against the Algier Accord 
and there were major reservations about the possible repercussions amongst the Clinton Administration. 
See Razi, G.H., 'The Nature and Sources of US Opposition to Iran: A Framework for Foreign Policy 
Analysis', The Iranian Journal for International Affairs, vol. 10, no. 3, (1998), p.246-247 
167 Sherman, B., Press Release: Sherman Welcomes Renewal of Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, (26 July 
200 l ), [ www .house.gov/Sherman/press/pr _ 0 l 0726 _ sanctionsact] 
168 Ackerman, G., Ackerman Demands Iran/Libya Sanctions Remain in Place, (23 May 2001), 
[ www .house.gov I Ackerman/press/ilsa] 
169 Berman, H.L., Reps. Berman. Gilman introduce legislation to extend Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, (23 
May 200 l ), [ www.house.gov/berman/pr05230 l] 
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Congress is also the focus of limited positive approaches. Within the Track 2 process, a 
likely precursor to formal relations between the two is informal meetings between US 
and Iranian parliamentarians. Communication between members of Congress and 
members of the Iranian Majlis have been proposed but failed on a number of occasions. 
There are a few in Congress, albeit in the minority that believe dialogue with Iran is the 
best policy option. Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney is one of those: "While 
Iranians have voted overwhelmingly in favor of reform and democratisation in three 
consecutive elections ... our policy has not matched these dramatic changes ... many of 
our interests would be better served through dialogue with Iran." 171 
Congress is a key player in Iranian policy mainly because of its connection with interest 
groups. The main influence on policy making towards Iran is the Israeli Lobby, whose 
primary constituency is Congress. The other interest group involved in the process is 
the Energy Lobby. Big business, especially American oil and gas companies, are keen 
to be allowed back into Iran. Dual containment has meant they have been consistently 
losing out to European and Asian rivals, who are signing more and more deals in Iran, 
despite the ILSA. 
4.1.2 The Defence Department 
The Defence Department and Congress are the two main government institutions that 
are maintaining and pushing for a tough policy on Iran. To justify their positions they 
continue to perpetuate the negative image of Iran and reinforce to the President, public 
and media the real dangers of Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, nuclear weapons 
proliferation and the disruption of the Middle East peace process. Secretary of Defence, 
Donald Rumsfeld summed up the Defence Department's view of Iran in a press briefing 
made on 1 April2002: 
17
° Cantor, E., News Room: House International Relations Committee Approves Five-Year Extension of 
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, (21 June 2001), [cantor.house.gov/newsroom/2001/20010621ilsa] 
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"Murderers are not martyrs. Targeting civilians is immoral, whatever the excuse. 
Terrorists have declared war on civilisation, and states like Iran, Iraq and Syria are 
inspiring and financing a culture of political murder and suicide bombing . . . These 
countries are not only trying to kill people outside their countries, but they are 
repressing their own people. They have an active program of denying the rights of the 
people in those three countries, that is vicious, repressive and, unfortunately 
successful." 172 
The Defence Department has its own motivations for adopting a hard line position. The 
potential nuclear threat from Iran or from terrorist groups sponsored by Iran is their 
main justification for the proposed anti ballistic weapons shield. They must show that 
countries like Iran have the capability and desire to attack the US in this way to justify 
to the government and people that the shield is a legitimate and necessary use of 
taxpayers money. The desire of the Defence Department to maintain its budget for 
weapons programmes is linked to the existence of a large military-industrial complex in 
America. Keeping alive the notion of an Iranian threat to the US, Israel and the region 
justifies military support and arms sales to Israel and other Gulf countries. Post the 
Cold War when domestic demand for military hardware declined dramatically, sales 
abroad have kept the massive military industry in the US profitable and prevented 
cutbacks that would have led to large job losses. The success of the Defence 
Department at keeping defence issues high on the agenda is indicated by the fact that 
the defence budget has remained at Cold War levels. Military spending during the Cold 
War averaged at $250 billion per year (1994 prices), excluding the Korean and Vietnam 
War years. In 1994, it had risen to $280 billion. 173 
Given the direction of policy under Clinton and the oil background of Vice President 
Cheney, US companies had hoped the Bush Administration would decrease sanctions 
and restrictions on trade with Iran. This has not occurred. Conversely, within eight 
months of Bush's presidency, the ILSA was renewed for five years with little objection 
from the administration. They merely insisted on a review of the act after two years. 
The Bush presidency has been sympathetic to Defence Department ideas. They have 
firmly supported the anti ballistic missile project and seem to view the potential threat 
172 Rumsfeld, D., DoD New Briefing, (Federal New Service, l April2002), 
[ www .defenselink.miVnews/ Apr2002/t040 12002 _ t040 l sd] 
173 Kegley, C.W. & Wittkopf, E.R., American Foreign Policy, p.306 
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from Iran in a similar way. Furthermore they wish to see domestic oil production 
increase and therefore use the Iranian threat to stability in the Middle East as 
justification for projects such as oil exploration in Alaska. The Financial Times 
reported in July 2001: "despite promising a policy review on Iran by June and openly 
questioning the effectiveness of sanctions in general, the Bush administration has put 
missile defence and domestic oil exploration ahead of Iran." The article quotes Gary 
Sick: "they have taken no steps that might in any way undercut their objectives. They 
have to justify National Missile Defence with the Iran threat and they are focusing on 
US [oil] production and don't want to undercut that domestic push."174 
4.1.3 The Israeli Lobby 
As has been shown, the Defence Department and the Bush presidency have a vested 
interest in maintaining the status quo on Iran and are unlikely to challenge the general 
policy consensus. The other facets of the policymaking system, such as Congress, the 
media, public opinion and the State Department are kept within the fold primarily by the 
Israeli Lobby. They play on preconceptions of Iran and on feelings towards Israel and 
use the system to maintain what can only be described as a Gramscian style hegemony 
over US policy. Not only do they push for policy forcibly, but also use ideological 
tools, which make policymakers and others believe unquestioningly in a specific image 
of and therefore policy towards Iran. 
What is the Israeli Lobby 
The Israeli Lobby is an amalgamation of groups within the United States whose aim is 
to maintain and improve relations between the US and Israel. Their objective is to 
maintain the security, well being and economic prosperity of Israel. Therefore issues of 
concern include the preservation of US economic and military assistance to Israel, 
justifying Israeli actions within the region and monitoring the behaviour and consequent 
US policy towards its adversaries. It is important to note that the Israeli Lobby is an 
American lobby and therefore the emphasis is very much on the promotion of shared 
174 Hoyos, C. & Dinmore, G., 'Bush cool on trying to improve relations with Iran', The Financial Times, 
(25 July 2001), [globalarchive.ft.com] 
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interests. In other words they aim to persuade the US government that working in 
Israel's interest also serves American interests. 
It is termed the Israeli Lobby because not all components of the Lobby are Jewish. 
Formidable Jewish organisations such as the Council of Presidents of Major American 
Jewish Organisations or the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) are 
included, but the Jewish Lobby has also formed alliances with groups such as the 
Christian right and, in the past, the civil rights movement. The growth of evangelism in 
the US has provided the Israeli Lobby with a prolific and receptive constituency within 
the US 'Bible Belt'. 
In the context of America's foreign policy, the most significant group in the Israeli 
Lobby is AIPAC. Formed in 1954 as the American Zionist Committee for Public 
Affairs, David Goldberg describes its task as "co-ordinating and directing public actions 
"on behalf of the American Zionist movement, bearing upon relations with 
governmental authorities, with a view to maintaining and improving friendship and 
good will between the United States and Israel." 175 Since those early days, AIPAC has 
grown into a highly organised, well-funded and hugely powerful force in American 
politics. The unswerving nature of US policy towards Israel despite criticism from 
many around the world has led some to believe that policy has become dictated by 
AIPAC. Certainly its power in Congress is infamous and has led to the description of 
Capitol Hill as "Israeli occupied territory." 176 It is well known as the one of the most 
powerful interest groups in Washington, second only to the American Association of 
Retired Persons. 177 The BBC correspondent, Stephan Sackur describes AlP AC as "the 
Arnold Schazenager of the lobbying world." 178 This tremendous influence comes 
despite Jews only making up 2% of the US population and membership of AIPAC 
numbering only 60,000 out of 5.6 million American Jews. 179 
The Israeli Lobby and particularly AIPAC lobbies the US government on Iran for a 
number of reasons. Iran's financial and moral support for the Palestinians, especially 
175 Goldberg, D.H., Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups: American and Canadian Jews Lobby for 
Israel, (Greenwood Press, London, 1990), p.l6 
176 Sackur, Stephen, 'A Lobby to Reckon With', (BBC Radio 4, 7 May 2002) 
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Palestinian militant groups is a direct threat to Israeli interests, both its security and 
moral legitimacy. Iran consistently condemns Israeli policy in the 'occupied territories' 
and formerly in Lebanon. Under no circumstances does AIPAC want these views 
accepted or even aired in Washington. Furthermore, Iranian rhetoric that calls for the 
elimination of Israel and the suspicions that Iran intends to gain advanced missile and 
eventually nuclear missile capability is useful to AlP AC to justify continued aid to 
Israel. This amounts to almost $3 billion a year, two-thirds of which is military aid. 
Israel is the largest recipient in the world of US aid, taking up 20% of the US's foreign 
aid budget. 180 During the Cold War, Israel could promote itself as the last front before 
the Soviet dominated Arab world. Now Israel has to point to the threat of Islamism, 
particularly emanating from Iran, as the reason why they need huge military spending 
and continued moral support. They claim to need US help to fend off encroaching 
Islamists, bent on the destruction of their peaceful, democratic state. The potential 
threat from Iran is therefore exaggerated by AIPAC before being widely disseminated in 
Washington. 
A recent example of Israeli influence on US policy towards Iran is highlighted in an 
Economist article discussing why Iran was included in President Bush's 'axis of evil'. 
A Likud Party elder apparently said the inclusion was "music to Israeli ears." 181 
According to the article, "Israel has been plugging away for years, publicly and 
diplomatically and through friends in Washington, on the dangers it fears from Iran."182 
AlP AC has been central to this process. As a senior official is quoted as saying, "the 
Americans never needed us for the facts ... but we tried to keep Iran on the agenda." 183 
The points to a major function of AlP AC which is to provide timely and specific 
information to government institutions, constantly reminding them of problems from 
Iran. 
Evidence of AIPAC's power in Washington is substantial, especially on policy towards 
Iran. At AIPAC's annual conference in 1995, President Clinton addressed the crowd 
promising to "contain Iran as the principle state sponsor of terrorism in the world" and 
he thanked the Israelis for "drawing our attention to Iran's history of supporting 
180 Sackur, Stephen, 'A Lobby to Reckon With', (BBC Radio 4, 7 May 2002), 'Briefing: America's 
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terrorism." 184 At the 2002 conference half the US Senate and ninety members of the 
lower house attended, showing that support for AIPAC is not merely tacit but active. 
Recent policy drives by AlP AC have included the extension of the ILSA and 
undermining Iran's positive contribution to the war in Afghanistan. Former Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Ambassador Robert Pelletreau discussed the 
renewal of ILSA in a speech to the American-Iranian Bar Association in March 2002: 
"Despite the fact that this legislation has been unenforceable during its initial five years, 
the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee had decided to make renewal a 
priority issue in 2001 as a way of highlighting both its own influence and Iran's 
continuing, unremitting hostility to Israel."185 After a very organised campaign of letter 
writing, press statements, articles and testimonies to both Houses, the ILSA extension 
was approved by 96 votes to 2 in the Senate and 409 votes to 6 in the House. 186 In the 
Committee for International Relations Subcommittee for the Middle East and South 
Asia hearing on ILSA renewal, two out of the four witnesses were part of the Israeli 
Lobby. Howard Kohr, executive director of AIPAC and Patrick Clawon from the 
Washington Institute of Near East Policy both gave evidence. The latter institution is 
known for its Israeli sympathies and produces many of the academic justifications for 
Israeli policy. Staggeringly, of the four witnesses only one represented the opposing 
camp and so for some, the Act was a done deal, initiated and pushed through by the 
Israeli Lobby. 
Why is the Israeli Lobby so influential? 
The influence that the Israeli Lobby has over American policy is only disputed at the 
margms. It is widely recognised that its influence is formidable to say the least, 
especially on policy towards Iran. 187 There are many reasons why this is the case. 
Firstly American society and consequently government is for a number of reasons 
sympathetic to Israel. The table below, quoted by David Goldberg, shows that 
183 Ibid 
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85 
sympathy for the Israeli cause in America has always outnumbered sympathies for the 
Arab viewpoint and over time has increased: 
American Popular Sympathies for Jews/Israel and Arabs, 1947-1988188 : 
Date Jews Arabs Both, Neither, Don't Know 
Nov 1947 24% 12% 64% 
June 1948 34% 12% 54% 
April1957 33% 17% 50% 
7 June 1967 56% 4% 40% 
Aug 1970 47% 6% 47% 
Oct 1973 39% 4% 56% 
Sep 1978 42% 12% 46% 
June 1982 39% 6% 52% 
Sep 1982 32% 28% 40% 
Jan 1988 47% 15% 38% 
May 1988 44% 13% 43% 
Similar ideological standpoints, shared heritage and guilt over the holocaust provide the 
main explanations for this phenomenon. However it is interesting to note the proportion 
of American society who do not have a preference. This implies that the majority of the 
population are indifferent to the conflict. In tum this implies that the American 
government's steadfast support for Israel is primarily elite driven. 
There are a number of features common to both America and Israel, which have 
enhanced understanding and friendship between the two. America and Israel have a 
shared heritage both in religious and sociological terms. Both originate in the Judo-
Christian tradition, which not only gives both societies shared views on morality and 
political systems, but common literature supports the very legitimacy and divine nature 
of Israel. Christian evangelists believe that the taking of Jerusalem by the Jews is an 
188 Goldberg, D.H., Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups: American and Canadian Jews Lobby for 
Israel, (Greenwood Press, London, 1990), p.27 
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essential precursor to the coming of the Messiah. 189 The pastor of the Cornerstone 
Church in the US summed up the strength of feeling towards Israel within the Christian 
right in an address to 10,000 followers and millions of television viewers: 
"God entered into an eternal covenant with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob that the nation of 
Israel would belong to the Jewish people forever and forever means 2002, 3002, 4002 
because forever is forever. Jerusalem is the eternal capital of the Jewish state not since 
Camp David but since King David- that's 3000 years ago ... We're going to stand by 
Israel through thick or thin until terrorists and terrorism are crushed." 190 
Within American society as a whole sympathy is also expressed towards Israel because 
of shared identification with common myths, most notably the pioneering or settler 
mentality. Just as the puritans believed that the colonisation of America was God's 
will, despite the existence of a native people, the colonisation of Palestine is seen in the 
same way. Just as formerly in the American Mid-West, Israel is seen as frontier state, 
open to and battling with the native savages, determined to fight God's work. Goldberg 
agrees, pointing to the following explanations for pro-Israeli sentiment: "feelings of 
Christian guilt concerning the European Holocaust; the image of Israel's 'David' to the 
Arab world's 'Goliath'; and the similarity of Israel's pioneering spirit and religious 
heritage to that of the American frontier experience." 191 
Sympathies towards Israel because they are on the front line against Islamic militants 
has undoubtedly risen after September 11th. AIPAC has not been shy of exploiting 
these feelings, especially to justify the recent incursions into the 'occupied territories'. 
Successful analogies have been drawn between America's global war on terrorism and 
Israel's ongoing battle against Palestinian militants. AIPAC published comments from 
both Senator Mitch McConnell and Congressman Tom Lantos in its Near East Report in 
November 2001 192: 
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"Israel has the expenence, dedication and freedom that is absolutely necessary to 
prevail over these fanatics ... We must stand arm in arm with our ally." 
(McConnell, 24 October 2001) 
"[It is] the ultimate of hypocrisy [for the State Department to criticize Israel's efforts to 
fight terrorism . . . I ask Powell whether Israel,] a democratic ally and a friend [is] 
entitled to pursue the terrorists who act against them exactly the same way we are 
entitled to pursue Osama bin Laden and his ilk." 
(Lantos, 24 October 2001) 
Most strategists in the US system believe that Israel's democratic system makes it a 
reliable and steadfast ally in the region. AlP AC is well aware that the US would be 
loathe to do anything to undermine this strategic alliance. 
A further explanation for AIPAC's influence, which in part explains why the US 
government is so receptive to AlP AC is the fact that there has been consistently a 
disproportionate number of American Jews in top positions in government. Within the 
Bush Administration, major players in foreign policy are Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle 
and Douglas Feith. All three are Jewish. The Democrat member of Congress, Joe 
Lieberman is also closely involved in foreign policy and is also Jewish. 193 Within the 
Clinton Administration, both the Secretary of State, Madeline Albright and the 
Secretary of Defence William Cohen have Jewish roots. Leading members of Clinton's 
National Security Council including the director, Sandy Berger and the Middle East 
director, Martin Indyk, were also Jewish. Interestingly, the latter was the author of the 
dual containment policy towards Iran and Iraq. In fact most of Clinton's NSC members 
were Jewish. 194 Furthermore Clinton's vice president, Al Gore was well known to be 
more pro-Israeli than Clinton. Gholam Razi, writing in the Iranian Journal of 
International Affairs in 1998 describes Jewish domination of the Clinton Administration 
as "completing the hijacking of the American government as Congress has already long 
been under their [the Jewish 'Friends of Israel'] influence." 195 Likewise, particularly 
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amongst the Bush Administration, Christian Zionists are highly influential. George W. 
Bush himself is openly devote. 
Having said that, no member of the American government has ever openly promoted a 
policy that damaged American interests in favour of Israel. Whilst it is true that Israel is 
able to exert considerable influence on government through its friends in high places, it 
is not the case that they can dictate policy. As the criticism of Sharon over the 
reoccupation of Palestinian territories shows, the American government are able, and do 
on occasion, to go against the Israeli position. The priority for American officials will 
always be American not Israeli interests. AIPAC and others only benefit if interests are 
deemed to be shared. 
The final reason why AlP AC is so influential is the US government structure, which 
makes it easy for highly organised groups like AlP AC to exploit it. AlP AC is a 
centralised organisation with a substantial budget. In the last three years, individual 
members have given over $3 million, averaging at $70,000 per person. 196 Much of this 
money is then distributed via Political Action Committees (PAC' s) to the election 
campaigns of Congressmen. According to The Week, "hundreds of members of both 
parties receive substantial pro-Israel contributions."197 This helps give the Israeli Lobby 
their disproportional influence. Campaign contributions are a significant feature of 
American politics because of the number, length and enormous cost of elections. 
Furthermore campaigns are not centrally controlled by a party as they are in countries 
such as the UK. It is therefore largely up to individuals to fund their own election 
campaigns, leaving them much more receptive to donors such as the Israeli Lobby. 
The reason that AIPAC is so influential on the Iranian issue is because they are merely 
reinforcing already established stereotypes. It would be very difficult to persuade the 
public and policy makers of an entirely new image of Iran, but AlP AC can, with 
comparative ease, play on the image Iran already has in the minds of most Americans. 
The basis of the hegemony of opinion towards Iran came from America's past 
experiences and views on Islam (discussed above). AIPAC merely has to work to 
maintain this image, using the dissemination of relevant information. As Gary Sick 
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points out, "they are pushing on an open door." 198 Stances taken against Iran is an easy 
vote winner. The lack of public knowledge and interest in Iran means an individual is 
unlikely to object to their congressman voting against Iran. Conversely what little they 
do know on the subject is more likely to lead to approval of a tough position. 
AlP AC is also disproportionately influential on Iran because there is no other 
significant lobby group present in the system. There is a substantial Iranian Diaspora in 
America but they are divided and disorganised. Arab lobby groups such as the Arab 
American Institute or American Muslims for Jerusalem do exist but they find it difficult 
to challenge the influence of AIPAC. The latter's director, Khalid Tirani said of access 
to Congress: "the doors are always open but the minds rarely are ... It is really an uphill 
battle especially with the efforts of the other side that is very well financed and very 
well organised."199 The only other area of lobbying is from energy interests. Oil and 
gas companies and associated interests however, find it difficult to fight against the 
moral legitimacy of AlP AC. When they push for opening up of trade with Iran, they 
leave themselves open to accusations of worrying just about profits and not about world 
security and human rights. The negative image in US society of big business such as oil 
companies does not help their cause. 
Furthermore President Bush has shown very little interest in policy towards Iran. 
AlP AC traditionally succeeds, through its links in Congress, only if the President does 
not get too involved. Ultimately AIPAC cannot force the President to act if he feels it is 
strongly against the US interest. "AIPAC like all ethnic pressure groups, is good at 
getting its way on things that presidents don't care much about."200 Therefore issues 
like Iran, which are actually on the periphery of problems in the Middle East and 
weapons proliferation, are easily manipulated by outside interests. Gary Sick believes 
US isolation of Iran has occurred because Iran is not a significant threat. He argues that 
if it were then the US would have to deal with the issue.201 AIPAC was much less 
successful at maintaining isolation of Iran during the latter years of the Clinton 
administration at just the time when President Clinton began to take an active interest in 
the possibility of engagement. With no similar initiatives from Bush, AIPAC has more 
of a free reign. 
198 Sick, G., Columbia University, (New York, 11 March 2002) 
199 Sackur, Stephen, 'A Lobby to Reckon With', (BBC Radio 4, 7 May 2002) 
200 
'Lexington: No Schmooze with the Jews', The Economist, (6 April2002) 
90 
How is the policy monopoly formed and maintained? 
When, in the case of Iran, there is such an enormous gap between Iranian stated policy, 
the opinions of others in the international scene such as Europe and the American 
position, the question must be asked, why is the American government so adamant its 
view of Iran is correct? The reality is that the hegemony, which has been building up 
over the years, is so strong that there are few in Washington prepared to voice criticism 
and certainly no one prepared to listen. 
Just as the US strives for supremacy in the world using both hegemony and domination, 
AIPAC operates in the same way in Washington. AIPAC works to persuade 
policymakers of an image of Iran and if that fails then they use economic coercion. 
Ultimately however, AlP AC recognises that they can be much more effective using 
hegemony rather than domination. If AlP AC is seen by the wider public and officials to 
be dominating the system, then they will be resented. Domination of policy by one 
group would be viewed as undemocratic and therefore illegitimate. AIPAC's success 
therefore lies in Washington and America's belief in AIPAC's views and objectives. 
When AlP AC provides a certain piece of information or pressures for a certain policy, 
the recipient largely sees it is as 'right' or 'given' and does not question the motivations 
or reliability of the source. Malcolm Honelie, who runs the Council of Presidents of 
Major Jewish Organisations, responds to the accusation that the Israeli Lobby has a 
disproportionate influence on the policy system by saying: "people look for sinister 
motivations and also its conspiratorial approach which are non existent. The reason that 
Americans support the policies the US has and that why Congress by overwhelming 
majority support Israel is because they believe in it. It's because they agree with it, 
because the cause resonates with them."202 The hegemony is perpetuated by the 
existence of underlying beliefs and perceptions that are manipulated and reinforced by 
AlP AC, the media and the US government in a never ending vicious circle. 
Figure 1. is a representation of the way the hegemony on policy towards Iran operates 
[see fig. 1]. The State Department and Defence Department release reports or make 
201 Sick, G., Columbia University, (New York, II March 2002) 
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statements on Iran based on US and Israeli intelligence. Likewise the President, 
following the advice of his advisors and government departments, will make speeches 
or give briefings. Elements of these statements or reports are picked up by the media 
and the Israeli Lobby. The media takes a press release, simplifies it and reproduces it in 
slogan form. A typical example of this is the media reporting of State Department 
Patterns of Global Terrorism Reports. The media uses sound bites such as 'Iran is the 
number one state sponsor of terrorism,' which implies to the lay reader that Iran is the 
primary cause of terrorism. These over simplified media reports provide information 
directly to the public and to varying degrees influence Congress and other politicians. 
Likewise, the Israeli Lobby focuses in on relevant parts on the reports, extracting 
supporting material and often exaggerating it. These edited extracts are then used to 
justify arguments to Congress and re-released back into the public domain via their own 
highly organised PR mechanism. The Israeli Lobby will also pick up news stories on 
Iran from the media in the same way. They extract elements from articles, passing only 
the edited version onto Congress and back to the media. The media also uses the Israeli 
Lobby's own information service and testimonies in Congressional hearings to produce 
articles on Iran. These articles go on to influence the public and Congress and are again 
used by the Israeli Lobby to justify policy towards Iran. And so the circle repeats. 
Put more simply, the Israeli Lobby acts as collector and distributor of information on 
Iran. The Israeli Lobby gathers in information from various sources and then edits it to 
fit their purpose. They then use their highly efficient organisation to disseminate the 
information to the already receptive audiences of the Congress, media and public. In 
this way the Israeli Lobby constantly reinforces conceptions of Iran and provides 
constant justification and reassurance to Washington and the wider public that 
American policy on Iran is unquestionably right. David Goldberg says that "AlP AC 
acts as a conduit of information and attitudes between the American Jewry, official 
Washington, and the broader American domestic political environment on matters of 
concern to its constituency."203 
Gramsci points to the necessity of intellectuals in the creation and maintenance of an 
hegemony. In this case the Israeli Lobby and those allied to their way of thinking are 
the intellectuals, successfully disseminating a particular view of Iran. According to 
203 Goldberg, D.H., Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups: American and Canadian Jews Lobby for 
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Gramsci' s these intellectuals could be anyone from the media, academia, politicians, 
clergy or anyone who has the standing and ability to influence or educate others. For 
the reasons discussed, the Israeli Lobby is in a very good position to educate 
Washington on Iran and does it to great effect. 
The Israeli Lobby disseminates information and therefore maintains its hegemony using 
a number of distinct methods. Academics affiliated to the Lobby such as those in the 
Washington Institute of Near East Policy research and produce articles that are printed, 
not only in their own publications, but also in other academic journals. This gives the 
information published or a position taken by the author a certain legitimacy. Articles 
and books produced by academics such as Patrick Clawson, Michael Eisenstadt and 
Anthony Cordesman consistently support the Israeli Lobby line.204 Information is thus 
put into the academic domain and used by students and professors alike the world over. 
These academics would undoubtedly refute that they work for the Israeli Lobby, 
arguing that they are independent and objective. This only goes to show how successful 
the hegemony is. If intellectuals recognised that they were themselves acting within an 
ideology, then the hegemony would fail. It would become merely propaganda. The 
ideology would become a viewpoint, rather than a representation of reality. 
As well as using affiliated institutions to publish information, organisations such as 
AlP AC also have their own publications. The most effective is the Near East Report. 
The Near East Report is designed to report on events affecting AIPAC's agenda. David 
Goldberg says: "through the distribution of the Near East Report and other research 
papers and memoranda, AlP AC seeks to maintain its credibility as a source of accurate 
information and reasoned analysis of US policy."205 Articles in the Near East Report 
tend to state the facts as AlP AC sees them. They avoid emotive rhetoric, choosing to 
use quotes and statistics. AIPAC therefore puts information into the public domain 
that on the face of it seems factual and therefore indisputable. The bias occurs in their 
selection and editing of material, the sources of which are not always clear and 
transparent. Take AIPAC's reporting of a conference held in Tehran in support of the 
204 See Clawson, P., 'The Continuing Logic of Dual Containment', Survival, Vol. 40 (1998), pp. 33-48; 
Cordesman, A., 'Iranian Force Trends', (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 February 2002), 
[www.washingtoninstitute.org]; Pipes, D. & Clawson, P., 'Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbours,' 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. I, (1993), pp.124-141; Cordesman, A. & Hashim, A., Iran Under Khatami: a 
political, economic and military assessment, (Westview, Oxford, 1997) & Eisenstadt, M., 'Living with a 
Nuclear Iran', Survival, vol. 41, no. 3 (1999) 
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Palestinians as an example [see appendix].206 The title of the article, "Conference of 
Hate" immediately sets the tone. The article then goes on to quote emotive extracts 
from the conference. These extracts are presented as official Iranian positions. A wider 
view of the Iranian position presents a considerably more complicated picture than the 
over simplified version published by AlP AC. 
As part of its campaign to get the ILSA renewed, AlP AC produced many articles 
'proving' the terrorist and proliferation of weapons threat from Iran. One article, "Fateh 
Fired" describes the testing of a short range missile operated from a mobile launcher 
[see appendix].207 The missile testing was widely reported in the Iranian press, but the 
Near East Report chose to draw America's attention to the potential danger if Iran 
passed the technology to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. There is no evidence 
presented that supports the idea that the missile was intended for terrorist purposes but 
the inference is enough. The article also discusses Iran's other missile capabilities and 
implies that they are substantial. Many analysts however, such as Gary Sick, believe 
AIPAC's views on Iran's military capabilities are heavily exaggerated to grab 
headlines. 208 There is no doubt that AlP AC' s continuous claims that Iran is a few years 
away from nuclear missiles has repeatedly been shown to be exaggerated and false, but 
such claims do attract considerable attention. 209 The article concludes with a direct 
reference to the benefits of ILSA, saying that even Congress is concerned enough with 
Iran's missile development to support an extension. The question must be asked 
however, without information and pressure from AIPAC, would Congress really be so 
concerned? 
After September 11th, reports began to appear in the Near East Report associating Iran 
indirectly with AI Qaeda and making sure Iran was put on the 'War on Terrorism' 
agenda. A report entitled "State Sponsors Held Accountable for Terrorism" is a typical 
example of the way AIPAC uses association, inference and careful editing to put its 
point across [see appendix].210 An extract of a speech made by President Bush is 
printed, ending with the words: "Either you are with us or against us, or you are with the 
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terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour or support 
terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." No mention of Iran 
was made in President Bush's speech, but the article goes on to quote carefully edited 
extracts from the US State Department, the World Tribune, the WorldNet Daily and the 
Los Angeles Times as evidence oflran's rising sponsorship of terrorism, especially anti 
Israeli. The inference is clear: Iran is one of those regimes that President Bush views as 
hostile to the US. In fact in the weeks following September 11th, when this article was 
published, Iran was viewed by the US administration as being remarkably constructive 
on the war on terrorism. Furthermore, as has been discussed in detail in the previous 
section, Iran's support for terrorism had been declining not rising. An article was also 
published in October discussing the links between Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, once again 
directly implicating Iran [see appendix].211 These articles were part of a larger 
campaign by AIPAC, who were keen to undermine Iran's improving relationship with 
the US after September 11th. 
The Israeli Lobby informs Congress in a number of ways. Firstly they appear as 
witnesses at relevant congressional hearings. As the hearing on the extension of ILSA 
showed, this can be extremely effective. However at an earlier stage, lobbying of 
individual members of Congress on various issues and Bills also takes place. AlP AC 
has six registered lobbyists who visit every member of Congress at least once a year? 12 
If a member of Congress needs particular attention, AlP AC will use its extensive 
network to get prominent individuals within a particular constituency to approach the 
member of Congress on a local level. These individuals are usually Christian or Jewish 
leaders with much sway in the community and therefore on the member of Congress. 
When there is a specific campaign under way, such as the extension of the ILSA, 
AlP AC will write letters and brief politicians to make sure every member of Congress is 
aware ofthe facts as AIPAC sees them.213 
Finally, the inclusion of the Christian right in the Israeli Lobby provides another 
platform for the dissemination of information. Church leaders regularly promote the 
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religious legitimacy of Israel as opposed to 'evil' Islamic opposition. The distinction 
between the 'good' of Christian Zionism and the 'evil' of regimes like Iran is 
continuously perpetuated by this powerful group in American society. It is no mistake 
for example that President Bush chose to use the words "axis of evil" in his State of the 
Union speech.214 Not only would it have resonated effectively across the nation, but the 
president is the product of that very Christian ideology. Such language would not have 
seemed strong or inappropriate to him or the listening public. 
At the margins of its hegemony the Israeli Lobby, particularly AIPAC is able to use its 
economic clout to coerce politicians. AIPAC's organisational and financial strength 
means it has the capacity to make or break political careers. Four or five times over the 
last twenty years AlP AC has used its PACs to pursue members of Congress who have 
voted against their line, pouring money into their opponents campaigns who 
subsequently beat them.215 The Week discusses the case of Charles Percy, a Republican 
on the Senate foreign relations committee in the early 80s: 
"[He] won awards from Jewish groups for his devotion to the cause. But when he 
started questioning Israel's policy on the West Bank, Jewish groups around the country, 
under AIPAC's guidance, started distributing flyers denouncing him as Israel's biggest 
enemy. Funds poured into the coffers of his rival, Paul Simon, and Percy was duly 
defeated in 1984. 'All the Jews in America, from coast to coast, gathered to oust 
Percy,' boasted Tom Dine, chairman of AIPAC at the time. 'and American politicians 
got the message. "'216 
Given that there is also a considerable lack of interest one way or the other within 
individual constituencies, it is hardly surprising that congressmen are reluctant to risk 
voting against AlP AC and in favour of Iran. The benefits would be minimal but the 
potential costs massive. 
This never-ending circle of information, opinion and stereotypes is perpetuated by all 
actors in the system, fuelled primarily by the Israeli Lobby and media. The same facts 
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and views are edited, recycled and repeated creating and maintaining a strong consensus 
of ideas on Iran. As Noam Chomsky points out, "defamation and vilification have 
become a highly developed art, and its agents have learned that with their easy access to 
the media, they can construct the most outlandish array of lies and deceit and establish 
them by mere repetition."217 Views on Iran are repeated and reinforced continuously 
within the hegemony in Washington. The demonisation of Iran that was established 
after the Revolution shows no sign of being discredited. The influence of the Israeli 
Lobby on policy towards Iran means that, whilst relations between Iran and Israel are so 
antagonistic, rapprochement with America remains near to impossible. 
4.2 Challenges to the Status Quo 
4.2.1 The Track 2 Process 
Within the States, challenges to American policy on Iran are minimal. This is due to the 
strength of the Israeli Lobby, the weight of ill feeling towards Iran, and also because of 
the relative weakness of dissenting academics, analysts and interest groups. The main 
intellectual challenge to policy is from what is known as the 'Track 2' process. These 
academics, journalists and politicians advocate dialogue on a person to person or culture 
to culture basis. They hope that through communication, trust and understanding 
between the two states will increase, leading eventually to direct government talks. It is 
hoped that Iran and the US can work on matters of mutual interest and talk directly 
about the problems in their relationship. Track 2 is not about building a friendship with 
Iran but its proponent's believe that America's interests are better served by 
communication, rather than isolation. 
Attempts have been made to increase dialogue between leading members of both 
societies, including meetings between members of Congress and members of the Iranian 
Majlis. Leading academics, such as Gary Sick at Columbia University, have encouraged 
Iranian professors to work in the US to further mutual understanding. Organisations 
such as the 'Open Society Institute' in New York (part of the Soros Foundation) and 
'Search for Common Ground' are also closely involved. OSI's catch phrase is 
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particularly appropriate to the Iranian case: "working to strengthen public discourse in 
areas where one view of an issue dominates all others, precluding alternatives."218 
Sporting events between the two nations such as football and wrestling matches have 
been played and there have even been meetings between American hostages and their 
former captors.Z19 
As far as parliamentary meetings are concerned, each attempt has failed, disrupted by 
external events. A meeting was in the pipeline before September 11th but was 
subsequently postponed. In the positive period for American Iranian relations between 
September 11th and the 'axis of evil' speech, a meeting was again put on the agenda. 
This time, encouragingly, it was initiated by the Iranians, who were keen to capitalise 
on improvements to the relationship after September 11th. The recent Israeli invasion 
of the West Bank and the 'axis of evil' speech has once again put paid to the meetings. 
The failure of the US to reign in the Israelis and the threatening rhetoric from the US 
made it impossible for Iranian reformists to justify domestically dialogue with 
American politicians. After the furore of the 'axis of evil' died down there were more 
discussions in Iran about communication with the US and even some suggestion that 
Supreme Leader Khamanei would support a commission set up to investigate the 
possibility. Iran's influential former president, Rafsanjani was also said to be 
supportive. The reformists applied pressure on the conservatives, arguing that "opening 
a dialogue with Washington - perhaps initially through contacts between Iranian 
parliamentarians and sympathetic US Congressmen - would be the best way to defuse 
tensions and perceived American threats to Iran."220 However Khamanei soon ended all 
speculation and firmly vetoed the idea. He was strongly supported by his conservative 
allies in Qom, who said: "Iran will not hold talks with the United States as long as the 
US doesn't change its anti-Iran behaviour and stop the irresponsible statements against 
Iran. 221 However with the support of the majority of the population, as well as many 
influential politicians, the idea of informal dialogue between Congress and the Majlis is 
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unlikely to be off the agenda for long. As early as September 2000, an opinion poll in 
Iran showed that 55% of the population would support restored ties with the US.222 
The mam emphasis of 'Track 2' has always been the promotion of cultural 
understanding because of the restrictions on political dialogue. Following September 
11 1\ the US made the visa procedure significantly more difficult for visiting Iranians. 
This has had the effect of making cultural exchanges all the more difficult and unlikely. 
In the current environment, 'Track 2' is unlikely to force a change in policy. However, 
its enthusiasts argue that should the environment alter, the groundwork and contacts are 
already in place. When attitudes do start to shift 'Track 2' can aid and accelerate the 
process. 
4.2.2 Khatami and Domestic Politics in Iran 
"The contact between the world of Islam and others, too, suffers from lack of trust, 
misunderstanding and unseemly interpretations, some of which have historical roots and 
some others arise from hegemony-seeking relations or the efforts of hegemonists to 
bring about insidious understandings. In this regard, by bringing about a suitable 
groundwork for dialogue between civilisations and cultures - with centrality given to 
[the views of] opinion holders- we must open the way to a fundamental understanding 
that can serve as the basis for true peace founded on the restoration of the rights of all 
nations, destroying the climate in which malicious propaganda can affect public 
opinion. "223 
(President Khatarni, speech to the OIC Conference in Tehran, December 1997) 
Since his first election victory in 1997, President Khatarni has been aware that to 
integrate successfully into the world, Iran needs to alter its image in the US. Just as in 
post war Italy, where the economic circumstances should have led to a communist 
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revolution, the practical and strategic realities of the American Iranian relationship 
should have led to some kind of rapprochement. In the Italian case, Gramsci believed 
the revolution failed because the appropriate superstructure did not exist; the people 
were not educated to believe in Communism. Likewise any kind of American Iranian 
rapprochement has failed because America and Iran remain ideologically and politically 
against such a move. Like Gramsci, if America is to accept an Islamic Republic of Iran 
and if the Iranian people are to accept a dialogue with the US, Khatami can see that 
ideas must play a greater role. He must persuade the US that Iran is not the ideological 
and political opponent they perceive. 
Khatami' s efforts represent the second significant challenge to the hegemony that exists 
in Washington. He has been trying to alter the negative preconceptions of Iran in the 
US in two ways. Firstly he has been attempting to persuade Iranians to tone down any 
antagonistic rhetoric. The Iranian American relationship cannot just be seen in terms of 
what they do, it must also be seen in terms of what they say. One of the reasons that 
America still sees Iran as a challenge, despite recent signs of pragmatism, is the 
confrontational nature of rhetoric emanating from Iran. Foucault believed that language 
dictates the way people think and therefore how they react. Despite the fact that many 
of the revolutionary slogans such as 'Death to America' or 'the Great Satan' have now 
become largely symbolic in Iran, in the US, they remain very damaging. This kind of 
antagonistic language only supports the already prevalent negative image of Iran. 
Practical policy changes must therefore be supported by changes in the language used. 
Khatami therefore, when 'death to America' is shouted at political rallies, has been 
known to call on the crowd to stop, arguing that they should talk of life not death?24 
Whilst he had some initial success, frictions between the conservative and reformist 
factions in Iranian politics have undermined his efforts. The debate about future 
relations with America has become a political football. Policy towards America 
symbolises so much of the origins and ethos of the revolution that it is the perfect tool 
for ideologues to use to criticise the reformers. Not only does criticising America 
provide the conservative faction with revolutionary credentials, it also provides a means 
to undermine Khatami politically. The conservatives are only too well aware of the 
224 Barraclough, S., 'Khatami and the Consensual Politics ofthe Islamic Republic', Journal of South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 22, no. 2, (1999), p.l2 
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damage an emotive and provocative statement, such as Israel being 'a cancerous 
tumour', can cause to Khatami' s policies of reconciliation and reintegration. 
In an echo of the 'track 2' process, Khatami' s second means of altering Iran's image has 
been to develop understanding of the Islamic Republic abroad. Again his main tool has 
been language. Travelling widely and conscious of the usefulness of the western media 
in getting his message across, Khatami has managed to provide the western world with 
a new discourse on Iran; a discourse that counters all previous stereotypes. Khatami has 
been at great pains to explain the history and perspectives of Iran using western ideas 
and language. For example he directly refutes Huntington's thesis calling consistently, 
not for a 'clash of civilisations' but a 'dialogue of civilisations'. In his interview with 
CNN in January 1998, broadcast directly to the American people, Khatami drew 
parallels between the American experience and the Iranian revolutionary project: "four 
centuries have passed since the beginning of American civilisation, human experience 
has taught us that prosperous life should hinge on three pillars: religiosity, liberty and 
justice. These are the assets and aspirations ofthe Islamic revolution as it enters the 21 51 
century."225 He argues the case of Islamic democracy by noting that American 
democracy was and remains based firmly on religious principles.226 He also went on to 
discuss some of the history of the American Iranian relationship, attempting to put the 
revolution and anti American feeling into some rational, historical context.227 Ansari 
says: "President Khatami sought to integrate the Iranian historical experience with that 
of the West and to weave a complex integrative narrative into a single text. Rather than 
a hegemonic clash, the case was made for a hegemonic synthesis. "228 
Such speeches have not only helped people to understand and relate to Iran better, but 
Khatami has also provided sympathetic western commentators with ideas, information 
and language they can use to counter the hegemony in the US. Khatami is conscious 
that he is not directly able to alter the political environment in Washington. Therefore 
he has concentrated his efforts on the American intelligensia (largely the media and 
academics), hoping, as Gramsci theorises, that they will spread and consolidate these 
ideas on Iran further. This is primarily the reasoning behind the 'dialogue of 
225 Khatami, 'Interview with CNN', BBC Summary of World Broadcasts ME/3120 MED/1, (9 January 
1998) 
226 Ibid 
227 Ibid 
228 Ansari, A., 'Iranian Foreign Policy under Khatami: Reform and Reintegration', p.51 
civilisations' project. In his CNN interview, Khatami called for people to people 
cultural exchanges and has since promoted much intellectual and cultural contact. The 
spin off from years of isolation has not only affected Iran politically and economically 
but they have remained intellectually isolated as well. This has only exacerbated 
misunderstandings. Through Khatami, Iran is attempting to rewrite the narrative on 
Iran, hoping to "crack the wall of mistrust"229 and challenge the monopoly of opinion in 
the US. 
K.hatami has had mixed success. Ansari claims: "President Khatami's success in 
presenting himself, both at home and abroad as a champion of progress, justice and 
democratic plurality continues unabated and represents the most rapid and dramatic 
shift in ideological perception and interpretation in recent years. The image of a 
turbaned mullah, fanatic and dogmatic, which permeated Western perceptions has been 
transformed in the space of a year."230 It certainly was the case that the initial response 
to Khatami from the US was positive. The Clinton Administration began making 
conciliatory statements and partially lifted sanctions. However, this ceased under the 
Bush Administration and, since the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks, 
there have been no further significant signs or opportunities for dialogue. 
Khatami's efforts are significantly limited by the conflicts within Iran's domestic 
politics. The more ideological elements in the system have consistently undermined his 
position with provocative statements and actions, especially towards Israel. 231 The 
supreme leader, Khamenai's immediate response to Khatami's CNN interview, whilst 
approving of Khatami' s criticisms of America, was to reiterate that "negotiations with 
America and relations with America do not have any benefits at all for the people of 
Iran . . . Negotiations with America and relations with America are harmful to the 
Iranian people. "232 There are two conflicting voices coming out of Iran and the 
Americans are clearly unsure which to listen to. The domestic realities in the US make 
them far more likely to take notice of the threatening, anti-American and anti-Israeli 
voice. Certainly recent criticism of Iran has concentrated on 'elements' of the Iranian 
229 Said by Khatami in his CNN Interview, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts ME/3120 MED/1, (9 
January 1998) 
230 Ansari, A., 'Iranian Foreign Policy under Khatami: Reform and Reintegration', p.55 
231 This has been a particular problem for Khatami since the Intifadah because support has been growing 
for anti Israel policies- it has been difficult for Khatami to condemn outright actions such as the Karine 
A arms shipment and anti-Israeli slogans and rhetoric 
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regime. For example, the 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report draws attention to 
the role of the conservative faction in the support of Palestinian rejectionist groups: 
"Although some within Iran would like to end this support, hardliners who hold the 
reigns of power continue to thwart any efforts to moderate these policies. "233 It is clear 
that unless the domestic political situation in Iran stabilises, Khatami will continue to 
find it difficult to convince the US oflran's sincerity. 
Despite their obvious failings, the track 2 process and the reform movement in Iran 
provide the only route out of the current deadlock. They are the main forces of change. 
When a system of ideas or perceptions become rigid, solidified and unquestioned they 
become increasingly unrealistic and contestable. As policy within the US has become 
more dogmatic, the more easily it is criticised and challenged by track 2, Iran and other 
governments or commentators. For example, the more rigid present US concerns about 
Iran have become, the more flaws and inconsistencies have been found. Likewise 
during the early revolutionary period, when Iran was convinced of the evilness of the 
US, it was much more easily and convincingly condemned by the rest of the world as 
irrational. Conversely if a position or idea is ambiguous, it is far more difficult to argue 
against. Certainty in ideas often leads to ambiguity as certainties become ever more 
easily challenged. 
The American Iranian relationship can be described as a senes of certainties and 
ambiguities, where the periods of ambiguity provide opportunities for rapprochement 
(See figure 2). As certainty in a policy position reaches a peak, the forces of change 
become more credible leading to a period of ambiguity. This was seen very clearly 
during the Clinton Administration. The rigid position of the early Clinton years was 
successfully challenged by the Khatami movement. Khatami initiated a period of 
ambiguity that was taken up by Clinton. Khatami understood that change would only 
occur if America's views on Iran moved from the certain towards the ambiguous, from 
dogma towards dialogue. This he did by attempting to challenge the certainties of 
American views of Iran and by attempting to alter the deep rooted views of the US from 
within Iran. Unfortunately however, antagonistic rhetoric and actions undermined the 
process, initiating a new period of certainty. 
232 Khamenai, S.A., 'Speech to worshippers at Friday prayers in Tehran on 16th January 1998', BBC 
Summary ofWorld Broadcasts ME/3128 MED/8, (19 January 1998) 
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5. CASE STUDY: THE AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11TH 
Relations between America and Iran have remained intractable over the last twenty 
years and look set to remain so. Numerous opportunities, numerous conciliation's from 
both sides and numerous efforts have been thwarted. Periods of ambiguity have given 
way to periods of certainty. The mistrust and misperceptions that exist between the two 
remain significantly unchallenged. The negative perceptions of Iran gained from 
historical experience and Islamic and Orientalist stereotypes have been solidified within 
American society. The atmosphere in Washington not only represents these American 
perceptions but has also helped to fuel and maintain them. Neither the 'track 2' process 
nor Khatami have made significant headway in undermining the monopoly of opinion 
on Iran. Iran itself has not helped the situation. The use of America in domestic Iranian 
politics has led to conflicting and confusing messages emanating from Tehran. 
The reasons for the stalemate have been examined in this thesis. However it is only by 
looking at them in the context of a practical example, that the extent ofthe problems can 
be seen. The attacks of September 11th and the subsequent events show clearly how the 
ideological conflict, the hegemony in Washington (particularly the influence of Israel) 
and the domestic political situation in Iran have consistently prevented opportunities for 
dialogue and reconciliation. 
Immediately following the attacks on New York and Washington, Khatami, along with 
other leading government officials, expressed their horror, sympathy and condemnation. 
"On behalf of the Iranian government and the nation, I condemn the hijacking attempts 
and terrorist attack on public centres in American cities which have killed a large 
number of innocent people. My deep sympathy goes out to the American nation, 
particularly those who have suffered from the attacks and also the families of the 
victims. Terrorism is doomed and the international community should stem it and take 
effective measure in a bid to eradicate it."234 The people of Iran took to the streets in a 
massive spontaneous outpouring of sympathy. Even leading figures in the conservative 
faction openly condemned the attacks leading to a unique consensus of approach 
234 Khatami, 'Response to the September lith attacks', [www.salamiran.org/Media/Pres_statement] 
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towards America. For the first time since 1979, the chanting of 'death to America' was 
. d F .d . T hr 235 not perm1tte at n ay prayers m e an. 
This move was in part a reflection of genuine horror at what had occurred, in part an 
attempt to deflect any rash reaction against Iran from the US. However in the main, it 
was an opportunity for Iran, especially reformist elements, to prove to the US that they 
had genuinely become a responsible and dependable member of the Islamic community; 
in other words, the very antithesis of Bin Laden and his associates. Just as Rafsanjani 
had hoped that Iran's neutrality during the Gulf War of the early 90s would prove to the 
world that Iran had changed, Khatami hoped Iran's actions after the attacks would help 
alter Iran's image once and for all. 
Iran backed up this rhetoric with constructive action. Although there was significant 
opposition to joining a US-led coalition against terrorism, Iran expressed the desire to 
join a UN-led campaign. Khamenai himself was the first cleric in the Muslim world to 
call for a jihad against terrorism.236 Khatami called for a meeting of the OIC where 
collaboration with the EU on fighting terrorism was agreed. When it became clear that 
the US's response would be strikes on Afghanistan, under its own command, there was 
criticism from some in Iran, but practical assistance and support was still offered. Iran 
offered to rescue any downed US pilots, opened the port of Bandar Abbas for 
humanitarian aid and closed its 560-mile border to prevent any Taliban or al-Qaeda 
fighters from escaping or gaining fresh supplies. Iran also agreed to take more refugees, 
despite already caring for the largest refugee population in the world, most from 
Afghanistan. During the fighting, Iran was instrumental in keeping the 'Northern 
Alliance' intact and then again instrumental in persuading many of the warlords to 
accept and support a broad based government during the conference in Bonn. Despite 
the unhealthy state of Iran's economy, the government also pledged $530 million over 
five years to go towards the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the largest amount given by 
any non first world country.237 
235 Bozorgmehr, N. & Dinmore, G., 'Iran changes tack in support of US', The Financial Times, (14 
September 200 I), [globalarchive.ft.com] 
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In the immediate months, Khatami travelled to America, making known his personal 
disgust of terrorism. He made speeches outlying his ideas using elements of western 
philosophy and attacked head on the idea that Bin Laden represented Islam or the 
Islamic people. He made sure his ideas were reported in the western press, personally 
giving interviews to papers such as the New York Times. Both the Economist and the 
New York Times quoted illustrative excerpts of a speech he made to religious leaders in 
a church in New York: 
"Vicious terrorists who concoct weapons out of religion are superficial literalists 
clinging to simplistic ideas. They are utterly incapable of understanding that perhaps 
inadvertently, they are turning religion into the handmaiden of the most decadent 
ideologies. While terrorists purport to be serving the cause of religion and accuse all 
those who disagree with them of heresy and sacrilege, they are serving the very 
ideologies they condemn. "238 
The New York Times also favourably reported Khatami' s speech to the UN in 
November 2001. This included condemnation of the perpetrators of the attacks, 
criticism of those who portray Islam as a religion opposed to the west and a call to 
prevent "a clash of civilisations and religions and the spread of hatred." He argued that 
Islam was a religion of peace and that the Islamic Republic of Iran was proof that 
Islamic government can be "a good model for all Islamic countries. "239 
The European response to Iran's statements and actions was predictably warm. Iran's 
initial reaction to the attacks prompted a visit by the UK's foreign secretary to Tehran, 
the first since 1979. Jack Straw praised Iran's "human understanding" and said that he 
counted the Iranian government among the "decent leaders of the Islamic world."240 A 
special envoy from France and both the Italian and German foreign ministers followed. 
The Financial Times reported at the time that "all expressed satisfaction with their 
238 Reported in 'Khatami's View', The Economist, (24 November 2001), 
[www.economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=876918] and Niebuhr, G., 'Religion Journal; Iran 
President Speaks on Faith and Civilization', The New York Times, (17 November 2000), 
[www.nyt.com]. Full transcript: Khatami, S.M., Complete Transcript: 'The Role of Religion in the 
Dialogue of Civilisations', (Speech made in Cathedral of St. John the Divine, New York City, 12 
November 2001) 
239 Sciolino, E., 'Iran Chief Rejects Bin Laden Message', The New York Times, (I 0 November 2001 ), 
~ www.nyt.com] 
40 Dinmore, G., 'Taking delicate steps towards Tehran', The Financial Times, (25 September 2001 ), 
[globalachive. ft. com] 
107 
meetings, indicating that Iran, despite its public criticism of the US-led attacks on 
Afghanistan, would play a constructive role in helping to bring stability to its 
neighbour. "241 The US's initial response was also encouraging. The US expressed 
gratitude and Iran's efforts were officially noted by both Congress and the State 
Department. Iran-watchers began to talk of the possibility of official communication. 
Ramazani wrote in October 2001: "it can be hoped that the emerging pattern of indirect, 
subtle and de facto co-operation between Iran and the United States will help to break 
down the current stalemate in US-Iran relations and will in the long run result in 
bilateral talks as a prelude to the ultimate resumption of diplomatic relations between 
the two countries. "242 
Then on January 29th 2002, President Bush gave his annual 'State of Union' address. In 
it, he said: 
"Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or 
our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have 
been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But we know their true nature. North Korea 
is a regime armed with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its 
citizens. Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected 
few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom. Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility 
toward America and to support terror . . . States like these and their terrorist allies, 
constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking 
weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger ... We'll 
be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers 
gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of 
America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the 
world's most destructive weapons."243 
The attack on Iraq was not unexpected but the inclusion of Iran in these scathing 
remarks surprised and horrified many. The Europeans and the rest of the coalition 
against terrorism were quick to state that they would be against any attack on Iran and 
241 Dinmore, G., 'Western politicians focus on Iranian position', The Financial Times, (23 October 2001), 
[globalarchive.ft.com] 
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warned the US that they were in danger of detrimentally undermining consensus within 
the coalition. The reaction from Iran was dismay and anger from the reformists and 
triumphalism from the conservatives. European commentators pointed out that 
aggressive statements from America merely undermined further reform in Iran and 
provided ammunition for anti-American conservatives.244 Given all the constructive 
policies Iran had undertaken since September 11th, why did the US chose to risk 
damaging the coalition, undermining change in Iran and destroy all hopes of imminent 
dialogue with Iran? The reality is that a few conciliatory statements and actions were 
not enough to break down the level of mistrust, animosity and misperceptions in the US. 
The image oflran, coupled with the strength of the hegemony in Washington means any 
opportunity for change is easily undermined and much happened in the intervening 
months between September 11th and the 'axis of evil' speech to do just that. 
Reports emerged that Iran was interfering in the governance of Kabul, favouring 
previous northern allies. These accusations however were dubious because they came 
from rival warlords in the south of Afghanistan. More damaging was the US 
announcement that it had intelligence suggesting that al-Qaeda suspects were being 
smuggled out of Afghanistan through Iran. This was denied by Iranian officials. As the 
Intifadah worsened, tensions between Israel and Iran increased. Former president 
Rafsanjani warned in December 2001 that Muslim countries armed with nuclear 
weapons could "annihilate" Israel.245 Deeply unpopular and politically sidelined by 
corruption charges, Rafsanjani however can no longer claim to speak for Iran. On 3rd 
January 2002 though, the Israelis intercepted a shipment of Iranian arms bound for the 
Palestinians. The type of weaponry involved clearly breached the Oslo Accords and if 
successfully delivered, could have significantly escalated the conflict. US intelligence 
confirmed the Iranian origin of the weapons, claiming that the Revolutionary Guard 
(IRGC) had been involved. The Iranian government denied knowledge of the shipment 
and launched an immediate investigation, but the damage was already done. The Bush 
Administration also continued to claim that Iran was developing nuclear, chemical and 
243 Bush, G.W., The President's State of the Union Address, (29 January 2002), 
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biological weapons, drawing attention to the possibility that they may pass them on to 
terrorist groups. 
It is highly likely that the people smuggling and arms shipment were not authorised by 
and probably not even known about by the Iranian government, particularly Khatami. 
Rogue elements within the IRGC, revolutionary ideologues within the regime or 'mafia' 
style gangs have all been blamed. For the US though, it was enough to prove that 
Iranian reform was failing. As Pelletreau says, "the spectre of such Iranian actions was 
powerful enough to override the modest level of practical co-ordination on Afghanistan 
coming from other parts of the Iranian Government. No longer, President Bush has 
decided, can the Iranian Government continue to have it both ways, that is, having 
different parts of the government following inconsistent policies without having to 
choose between them. Henceforth, the Iranian Government as a whole will be held 
responsible for the actions of any one of its parts."246 
As can be seen from the strength of Bush's speech, these events had a dramatic effect 
on the American approach. However no other country allied to America followed suit. 
Indeed, according to the Economist, "just about everyone, except for the American 
administration, seems to agree that Iran's post-September role in Afghanistan has been 
mostly constructive."247 Europe in particular continued to maintain that Iran's negative 
actions were carried out by elements of the regime, which are best contained by 
engaging and encouraging reform. If the rest of world deemed Iranian actions to be 
largely insignificant then the American approach cannot be explained solely by Iran's 
misdemeanours. 
Once again, the Israeli Lobby and the Defence Department, playing on already deep 
rooted suspicions and attitudes were not insignificant to the dramatic U-tum. In fact the 
actions of Iranian hardliners were so useful to the Israeli Lobby that conspiracy theories 
began to emerge. People argued that both shared a significant mutual interest in 
undermining the Khatami project. Immediately after the attacks, the Israeli Lobby in 
Washington sought to capture the agenda by drawing analogies between Israel's 
suffering from terrorism and what America was going through. Playing on increased 
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anger and fear of Islamic terrorism, Israel sought to reassert its place as the only true 
friend of the US in the region. Initially they had very little success. Their efforts came 
across as an attempt to make cheap political capital and were viewed as inappropriate. 
People's attention turned from initial shock to trying to explain the reasons why the 
attacks had happened. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was one of the possible 
explanations and efforts turned to finding a solution at any cost. Israeli actions in the 
'occupied territories' were consistently criticised and reigned in by the US in an effort 
to maintain some kind of atmosphere for peace. However, as time passed the Israeli 
Lobby applied more influence and the atmosphere in Washington changed. 
Congressman began to openly criticise Bush and the State Department, arguing that 
Israel fighting terrorism was equally legitimate to the US's war on terrorism.Z48 The 
American agenda shifted from finding solutions to the conflict to supporting the 
dissolution and reform of the Palestinian infrastructure (including its elected President, 
Arafat), in the name of fighting terrorism. 
The Israeli Lobby were horrified to see signs of co-operation from Iran, their nemesis in 
the region and they did all they could to undermine Iran's influence in Washington. 
They began to lobby the media and Congress with emotive and exaggerated reports, 
aimed at putting the idea of a dangerous Iran back into circulation. As early as 241h 
September 2001, the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs published an article 
entitled, 'Iran: part of the problem or part of the solution?', cautioning against co-
operation with Iran by listing all of Iran's alleged involvement in terrorism since the 
1983 Beirut bombings.249 Another report published in AIPAC's Near East Report in 
November 2001 included a series of vague and speculative claims about Iran's potential 
weapons capability, portrayed as fact: "intelligence sources have confirmed publicly 
that Iran's locally produced Shahab-3 intermediate range ballistic missile ~ ... able to 
strike anywhere in Israel - has entered full production and is expected to be deployed in 
the near future. The missiles could potentially be armed with chemical or biological 
warheads ... During the next decade, Iran's military purchases from the Russians could 
total some $300 million annually."250 [Italics added] 
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The Economist partially explained Iran's 'apparent reversion to type' in January 2002 as 
mere Israeli presentation: "the Israelis would dearly like to see Iran a target in 
America's anti-terrorist campaign. Consequently, Israel made more of Mr Rafsanjani's 
comments than they merited ... and has presented the seizure of the ship, apparently on 
its way to deliver missiles to the Palestinians, as evidence of a new terror nexus 
involving Iran, the Palestinian Authority and Hizbullah."251 
As the strength of Bush's speech and consequent statements by leading American 
officials suggest, the Israeli Lobby's efforts were highly effective. Secretary of State 
Colin Powell followed up Bush's speech in testimony to the House International 
Relations Committee in February 2002: "We're making it clear to the Iranians that 
you've got to choose. If you want to be part of a world that's moving forward, it's time 
to stop being a state sponsor of terrorism. "252 Head of the CIA George Tenet also 
backed up the US's disapproval and concerns in a testimony to the Armed Services 
Committee in March 2002: "The initial signs of Tehran's co-operation and common 
cause with us in Afghanistan are being eclipsed by Iranian efforts to undermine the US 
there ... We have seen little reduction in Iran's support for terrorism in the past year ... 
Iran remains a serious concern because of its across-the-board pursuit of WMD and 
missile capabilities."253 Finally Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld again condemned 
Iranian behaviour in a Defence Department briefing on 1 April 2002.254 
The Israeli Lobby, however, were not the only players in Washington pushing for a 
tough line on Iran. Many saw the inclusion of Iran in an 'axis of evil' with Iraq and 
North Korea in President Bush's State ofthe Union speech as a triumph of the influence 
ofthe Defence Department over the State Department.255 Following the September 11th 
attacks, terrorism and combating terrorism were the priorities of the Bush 
Administration. Previous priorities, such as the missile shield were forced to take a 
back seat. The Defence Department became increasingly concerned at the links being 
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cultivated with Iran by the State Department to aid the 'war on terrorism. Without the 
threat from 'rogue' states like Iran, the missile shield was more difficult to justify. The 
Defence Department therefore sought to catapult nuclear proliferation back to the top of 
the agenda. They reawakened concerns about Iran's weapons programme within the 
Administration and therefore pushed the president into publicly acknowledging and 
reinforcing the potential nuclear threat of Iran. 
Once again Iran's pragmatists and conciliatory Americans were undermined by Iranian 
hard liners, Israel and the Israeli Lobby, the Defence Department and attitudes prevalent 
in Washington and the opportunity for rapprochement passed. 
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CONCLUSION 
There can be no way forward for the US Iranian relationship as things currently stand in 
Washington and in Iran. The US's 'realist' justifications for policy must be recognised 
as such and the ideological aspect of the relationship must be acknowledged and 
addressed. As it is, both America and Iran are still perceived by many in both countries 
as two competing and incompatible worldviews pitted against one another. The idea of 
the hegemonic contest remains. This is largely for four reasons. 
Firstly, the lack of communication and isolation since the Revolution has perpetuated 
mistrust and misunderstandings. The image of Iran in the US is still trapped in the past, 
making the US increasingly sceptical about the capability of the Islamic Republic to 
reform. The very fact that there is support in Washington, albeit tiny, for the Shah's son 
to regain the throne shows how out of touch America really is with realities in Iran. 
Secondly, deep divisions in Iran's domestic politics have kept the American issue 
current and highly controversial. Forming some kind of dialogue with America 
represents what the reformists are trying to achieve and consequently what the 
conservatives are desperate to undermine. The basis of the revolutionary project in 
opposing American imperialism hold strong today, making compromise near to 
impossible. Until there is one, consistent, reformist vmce emerging from Iran, 
negotiation with America is unlikely to succeed. 
Israel is another significant obstacle. The Israeli government, through the Israeli Lobby, 
helps to keep the negative image of Iran prominent. Any positive moves by Iran are 
consistently undermined by the strength of influence Iran's adversaries have in 
Washington. This is such a significant problem that many commentators in Washington 
believe that Iran will never have relations with the US until it has built up relations with 
Israel. In the present climate, this looks a long way off. 
Finally there is the problem of deep-rooted perceptions and beliefs. Due to the impact 
of the revolution and revolutionary ideology, the prevalence of Orientalist and neo-
Orientalist stereotypes in America, an Islamic Iran will always be seen as an opponent 
of and contradiction to, in the Gramscian sense, the US's world order. Likewise, the 
history of antagonism means the US will always be viewed by Iran with the utmost 
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suspicion. Both America and Iran must look beyond the decades of demonisation and 
antagonism to see that now all that is between them are ideas. Ideas that can and are 
being challenged. Perceptions are not static or set in stone. Images and perceptions can 
alter merely with changes in presentation. Some in Iran, like Khatami, have begun to 
tackle this but they still have a very long way to go. It will not be until slogans such as 
'death to America' or 'death to Israel' are no longer shouted in the mosques of Tehran 
or until people in America are educated in the ways and history of Islam and Islamic 
rule that America will even begin to relate to and understand Iran. Even then, centuries 
of negative stereotypes and decades of history will have to be rewritten and relearned. 
In an era where the threat from political Islam has become the new communism, this 
will be all the more difficult. 
The US must be aware of its own image in the world. Unless America makes changes 
to the way it presents itself, they will fail to maintain and extend their world hegemony. 
The outpouring of sympathy and support after September 11th from all over the world, 
including the Middle East, was an opportunity for the US to consolidate and extend its 
influence. America's success as a superpower has always been due to its ability to 
make people believe in American ideologies and September 11th did much to boost 
these ideas. It was a period where the boundaries of right and wrong, of civilised and 
barbaric were clearly defined. The choice between American values of freedom and 
universal rights and the values of indiscriminate terrorism was stark and obvious. 
America has not capitalised on this opportunity. Elements of unilateralism and 
dogmatism have crept into statements and policies leading to tensions in the world 
consensus. Opinions on the US's policies towards the conflict in the Middle East have 
reverted to accusations of double standards and bias towards Israel. Unilateral measures 
such as calling for the end of the leadership of the Palestinian Authority's 
democratically elected president, Arafat, or pushing for military action against Iraq have 
again isolated America from the world. American moves such as these are not viewed 
universally as legitimate targets for the US's war on terrorism which would benefit the 
whole international community, but are viewed as American domination. America has 
reverted to coercion not consensus, significantly damaging its hegemony. The 
American academic, Joseph Nye's criticises American foreign policy, arguing that: "the 
trick to extending American influence into the far future is to cajole and seduce the 
world into wanting what America wants rather than to bully it into sullen submission. 
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And nothing could be more deeply American, for a country whose Founding Fathers set 
out their arguments for independence with 'a decent Respect to the Opinions of 
Mankind'. "256 
America's dealings with Iran are a case in point. Isolation, criticism and condemnation 
of Iran only decreases US influence and ability to alter Iran for the better. Iran is a 
proud and independent country, only too aware of America's domination in the region 
and determined to resist it. However, as Khatami has shown, Iran is not adverse to 
communication with the US on an equal footing. Even if America's intention is to 
dominate the region, they must attempt to portray themselves differently. Otherwise the 
resentment that first emerged in Iran and is fostered in other parts of the Middle East 
will build up until America is rejected outright as an exploiter not friend of the region. 
The Iranian perspective of America will become universally accepted, much to the 
detriment of American influence and power. 
America's containment policy feeds the very behaviour in Iran the US wishes to 
control. American engagement, on the other hand, could feed the behaviour the US 
wishes to encourage. If the US allows Iran to become part of the world order, 
recognising its strategic interests as legitimate, allowing it to become part of the 
economic community, the ideological challenge that Iran represents will disappear. Iran 
will have far more to lose from antagonising the US and very little justification for its 
criticism. If this policy ever emerges however, it will have to balance on a very narrow 
tightrope. If at any stage, America is deemed to be dominating Iran or Iran is deemed to 
be returning to its revolutionary past, rapprochement will falter. 
Any form of rapprochement seems in the distant future. Suspicions and misperceptions 
on both sides remain too strong. The next opportunity for dialogue and co-operation 
lies in the forthcoming US action against Iraq. No matter what form this may take -
military, economic, or political - the US will need Iran's co-operation. Iran's 
intelligence, influence and contacts amongst the Shi'ite and Kurdish communities 
(opponents of the Hussein regime), and practical assistance will all be useful, if not 
necessary, to any military campaign. If economic sanctions are to work, Iran must be 
willing to enforce them on its border. Likewise a political uprising or coup will involve 
256 Walker, M., 'Safety in Numbers', Review of The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only 
Superpower Can't Go Alone by Joseph Nye, The Washington Post, (3 March 2002) 
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Shi'ite and Kurdish political figures allied to the Iranian government. The chances of 
this co-operation leading to rapprochement already looks highly unlikely. The 
Americans have voiced considerable concern over the prospect of a pro Iranian 
government in Iraq. Tehran, despite Saddam Hussein being no friend of the Iranians, 
has consistently opposed US action, horrified at the idea of an American military 
presence on both their eastern and western borders. Ideological antagonism may again 
prevent both from working together to benefit mutual interests. 
It will not be until the 'wall of mistrust' can be broken down that rapprochement will 
ever succeed. Whether Khatami and the reformist movement or the 'track 2' process in 
Washington will ever be strong enough to do this is a hope, rather than a certainty. 
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